Teardown

Insurance · Deep dive

Verisk Analytics

The insurer-owned ratings bureau founded in 1971 that became a for-profit near-monopoly on U.S. property-casualty data — ISO standardized policy forms, industry loss costs, catastrophe models, and the Xactimate claims-estimating platform that sits inside nearly every U.S. property claim — now a ~$3.1B-revenue, ~56%-EBITDA-margin pure-play after shedding energy and financial-services units, but wearing a rich multiple into an AI-disruption debate.

well positioned

Verisk owns irreplaceable, industry-pooled insurance data assets that every major U.S. P&C carrier depends on, sold on ~80%+ recurring subscriptions at ~56% EBITDA margins with enormous switching costs — a compounding, regulator-embedded moat whose only real threats are valuation and a still-unproven AI-commoditization thesis.

My take

HQ
Jersey City, NJ
Founded
1971 (as Insurance Services Office, Inc.)
Ownership
Public (Nasdaq: VRSK); widely held, institution-dominated float since the 2009 IPO
Funding
No venture history; formed 1971 as a nonprofit insurer-owned ratings bureau, converted to a for-profit corporation in 1997, IPO October 2009 (secondary sale by insurer owners, ~$1.9B raised for selling holders). Since then a serial acquirer (~40+ deals since 2000) funded from cash flow and debt.
Valuation
Market capitalization about $25B in spring 2026 (roughly $175/share, down ~35% over the prior 52 weeks from a peak above $40B); enterprise value ~$28B; trailing P/E ~28x, forward ~24x, EV/EBITDA ~19x (market data, May 2026)
Revenue
About $3,073M in FY2025 (year ended Dec 31, 2025), up 6.6% organic, from $2.88B in 2024, $2.68B in 2023, $2.50B in 2022, $2.46B in 2021 and $2.27B in 2020; FY2025 net income ~$908M, adjusted EBITDA ~$1,727M (~56% margin), free cash flow ~$1,192M (company earnings releases, Feb 2026)
Headcount
Approximately 7,000-7,500 globally in 2024-2025, concentrated in the U.S. with growing European operations after a run of claims-tech tuck-ins; some employee complaints of recurring layoffs despite record revenue (Glassdoor, 2024-2025)
Screen
Public incumbent — a data/analytics monopoly serving 100% of the top 100 U.S. P&C insurers, ~$3.1B FY2025 revenue, ~56% adjusted EBITDA margin, ~$25B+ market cap, with a deep proprietary-data and software technology component.
Published
2026-07-21
Web
www.verisk.com
Elsewhere
LinkedIn · Crunchbase

Founders and leadership

  • Lee M. Shavel President & Chief Executive Officer (CEO since May 2022, President since January 2023)

    A 30-plus-year financial executive rather than an insurance lifer, Shavel is the architect of Verisk's transformation into a re/insurance pure-play. He joined Verisk in 2017 as CFO, where he modernized treasury, investor relations, and procurement, then took the CEO seat in May 2022 and drove the divestitures of Wood Mackenzie (energy), Verisk Financial, and 3E (environmental health and safety). Before Verisk he was EVP and CFO of Nasdaq, Inc. from 2011 to 2016, and earlier spent 1993-2011 at Bank of America Merrill Lynch running Americas financial-institutions investment banking. He holds a BA in English and a BS in economics from the University of Pennsylvania and Wharton, and sits on the FactSet board. He was appointed to the U.S. Treasury's Federal Advisory Committee on Insurance.

  • Insurance Services Office (ISO), 1971 origin Founding entity

    Verisk has no individual founder. It began on March 22, 1971, when a consortium of U.S. property-casualty insurers and state rating bureaus merged their statistical operations into Insurance Services Office, Inc., a nonprofit ratings bureau in New York. The merger was possible because the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945 granted insurers a limited antitrust exemption to pool loss data and file joint rates. ISO's job was to fix a fragmented market: standardize policy forms and produce credible, industry-wide loss-cost data so member carriers could price risk. That pooled-data utility is the seed of every moat the company has today.

  • Frank J. Coyne (former Chairman & CEO) Led the for-profit build-out and 2009 IPO

    Coyne ran ISO/Verisk through the pivotal years — the completion of its shift from an industry cooperative into a for-profit analytics company and the October 2009 IPO that made insurer-owners into public shareholders. His successor Scott Stephenson led the mid-2010s expansion (and the ill-fated energy diversification) before Shavel refocused the company.

Snapshot

Verisk Analytics is the data-and-analytics utility the U.S. property-casualty insurance industry built for itself and then lost control of. Founded in 1971 as the nonprofit Insurance Services Office, it converted to for-profit in 1997 and IPO’d in 2009, and today it sells the standardized policy forms (ISO forms), regulator-filed loss costs, actuarial and statistical data, catastrophe models, anti-fraud tools, and the Xactimate claims-estimating platform that virtually every major carrier and a large share of the claims ecosystem depend on. After shedding its energy (Wood Mackenzie), financial-services, and environmental units in 2022-2023, it is a focused ~$3.1B-revenue (FY2025) insurance pure-play running ~56% adjusted EBITDA margins on largely recurring subscription revenue. It matters as the reference case for a genuine data monopoly — near-100% penetration of the top 100 U.S. P&C insurers, regulator-embedded standards, and switching costs so high the debate is not whether the moat is real but whether AI can erode it.

Founding story

Verisk’s origin is a piece of insurance regulatory history, not a garage. Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, Congress gave insurers a limited antitrust exemption to pool loss experience and file joint rates — the only way, at the time, to price risk credibly in a fragmented market. On March 22, 1971, a consortium of P&C insurers and state rating bureaus merged their statistical operations into Insurance Services Office, Inc., a New York nonprofit whose mandate was to standardize policy language and produce industry-wide loss-cost data so member carriers could set adequate rates.

The transformation came in two moves. In 1997 ISO converted from a nonprofit cooperative into a for-profit corporation, and its founding carriers were gradually required to relinquish control — the moment an industry cost-sharing arrangement became a business with pricing power over its own creators. Then, on October 6, 2009, the renamed Verisk Analytics went public in the largest U.S. IPO of the year, pricing 85.25 million shares at $22 and raising about $1.9 billion — but for the selling insurer-owners, not the company: a pure secondary that let them cash out and set a market price.

How it works

The mechanics rest on a data flywheel almost impossible to reconstruct from scratch. Verisk collects granular, policy- and claim-level data contributed by hundreds of insurers — billions of records on premiums, exposures, and losses — and normalizes it into products no single carrier could build alone: ISO standardized policy forms (the contract language most homeowners, commercial, and auto policies are written on), advisory prospective loss costs filed with and approved by state regulators, and actuarial and rating tools carriers plug into their pricing. Because the data is industry-wide and the forms regulator-blessed, adopting them is the path of least resistance; the alternative is building a credible loss database alone and defending non-standard language before 50 state regulators.

On the modeling side, Verisk’s Extreme Event Solutions (the former AIR Worldwide) runs probabilistic catastrophe models that simulate tens of thousands of synthetic hazard years to output the expected losses insurers and reinsurers use to price risk. On the claims side, Xactimate (from the 2006 Xactware deal) is the estimating engine: an adjuster or contractor builds a line-item scope of repair, and the platform prices each task from Verisk’s independently researched, region-specific reconstruction-cost database, refreshed against material and labor surveys. Because carriers and their vendors settle a huge share of U.S. property claims through Xactimate, it effectively sets the reference price for what a repair “should” cost — exactly where the controversy lives.

Product and business overview

Post-divestiture, Verisk reports two core areas. Underwriting Solutions is the historic ISO franchise: standardized forms, loss costs, rating and actuarial data, underwriting attributes, property and address data, telematics, and marketing analytics. Claims Solutions spans Xactimate/Xactware property estimating, anti-fraud analytics, claims-workflow and casualty tools, and a growing set of European claims-tech businesses. Cutting across both is Extreme Event Solutions (catastrophe modeling) plus specialty and climate data. The through-line is proprietary data plus the software that consumes it — Verisk sells both fuel and engine, which is why customers rarely leave.

Business model and pricing

The model is why the stock trades where it does. The large majority of revenue — Verisk describes it as overwhelmingly recurring, ~80%-plus subscription/long-term-agreement — is booked as multi-year subscriptions renewed at high retention, plus transactional revenue that scales with claim and policy volume. Verisk publishes no enterprise price lists; deals are negotiated per carrier by data set, seat, and volume, and Xactimate is sold to contractors and adjusters on tiered subscriptions. The economics are extraordinary: FY2025 revenue of ~$3.07B converted to ~$1.73B of adjusted EBITDA (~56% margin) and ~$1.19B of free cash flow (up ~30%). Margins expanded from ~54.7% in 2024, and the company returns cash aggressively — a dividend raised 11% to $0.50/quarter and a buyback lifted to $2.5B in early 2026. Once data is collected, distributing another subscription is nearly free, so incremental revenue drops to the bottom line.

Traction over time

YearRevenueProfitability / marginEvent
2020~$2.27Bhigh-40s% adj. EBITDA marginPre-refocus; still owns energy/financial units
2021~$2.46B+8.5% growth
2022~$2.50BSells Verisk Financial and 3E; agrees to sell Wood Mackenzie
2023~$2.68Badj. EBITDA margin ~53.5%Closes ~$3.1B Wood Mackenzie sale (Feb); pure-play insurance
2024~$2.88Bnet income boosted by prior gains; margin ~54.7%+7.5% growth; European claims tuck-ins
2025~$3.073Bnet income ~$908M; adj. EBITDA ~$1,727M (~56%); FCF ~$1,192M+6.6% organic; buyback raised to $2.5B
Q1 2026adj. EBITDA margin low-55%sOrganic growth slows to ~3.9%, which management called a “trough”

The arc is a company that got smaller in revenue (shedding energy and financial units) but far higher in quality — margins up, cash flow up, revenue almost entirely recurring. The soft spot is growth: organic revenue decelerated from ~7.5% (2024) to ~6.6% (2025) to ~3.9% in Q1 2026, the crux of the valuation debate.

Market analysis

The addressable market Verisk anchors — insurance data and analytics — is estimated at roughly $17.5-19.6 billion in 2025 across research firms, with low-to-mid-teens CAGRs pushing it toward ~$50B by the early 2030s (Straits Research: ~$17.5B in 2025 to ~$51B by 2033 at ~14.4%). The structural forces are favorable: rising climate/catastrophe volatility (a tailwind for cat models), regulatory demand for rate adequacy (which entrenches ISO’s filed loss costs), escalating fraud, and a push to automate underwriting and claims — all pulling carriers toward more third-party data, not less. The countervailing force is AI: if models plus a carrier’s own data could someday substitute for pooled industry data, the moat narrows. Verisk’s rebuttal is that regulators require representative, industry-wide data to approve rates, and no carrier’s internal data is broad enough — so AI becomes a tool that runs on Verisk’s data, not a replacement for it.

Competitive intel

Verisk’s monopoly is real in its core but contested at the edges. LexisNexis Risk Solutions (RELX) is the strongest broad rival, dominant in contributory driver/claims histories and identity/fraud — the underwriting-data and anti-fraud segments where pooled third-party data is most contestable. Cotality (the former CoreLogic, taken private ~$8B in 2021 and rebranded 2025) competes in property risk and reconstruction-cost data that overlaps Xactimate’s inputs. Moody’s RMS (acquired ~$2B in 2021) is the co-standard in catastrophe modeling and the most credible threat to Verisk’s cat franchise. CCC Intelligent Solutions owns auto claims estimating the way Xactimate owns property — the reason Verisk’s estimating dominance is concentrated in property lines. TransUnion and the credit bureaus nibble at insurance scoring, and Guidewire/Duck Creek are adjacent core-system vendors accumulating policy and claims data that could over time disintermediate some feeds. Where Verisk wins is the combination no rival replicates: regulator-filed loss costs, standardized forms every carrier already uses, and industry-scale pooled data with decades of history. Where it is vulnerable is any single vertical — auto, cat modeling, property data — where a focused competitor has parity.

History and evolution

What people say

The case for. Analysts and investors treat Verisk as one of the cleanest data-monopoly compounders in the market: near-100% penetration of the top 100 U.S. P&C insurers, ~80%+ recurring revenue, ~56% EBITDA margins, and switching costs rooted in regulator-filed standards. Raymond James upgraded the stock to Strong Buy with a ~$260 target in early 2026, citing the value of the proprietary data assets and margin expansion; multiple firms (RBC, BMO, Baird, JPMorgan, Wells Fargo) keep positive ratings. The bull framing is that AI needs Verisk’s data to be useful — carriers cannot satisfy state rate-adequacy rules with their own data alone — so AI is a tailwind, not a solvent. Employees rate Verisk ~3.8/5 on Glassdoor across ~1,500 reviews, 78% recommending it, with strong marks for work-life balance (4.2) and culture (4.0).

The complaints. The loudest external criticism comes from contractors and policyholders, and it goes to the heart of Xactimate. Restoration and roofing contractors argue the platform’s reconstruction pricing is systematically too low and too generic — based on median surveys that lag real market costs — and that carriers and adjusters use it to underpay claims, alleging 20-40% underpayment on storm claims. Consumer advocates (United Policyholders) and plaintiff lawyers argue in cases like Sheahan v. State Farm that adjusters manipulate Xactimate at the line-item level to deflate payouts, and a 2025 legal-press piece framed it as software used to underpay wildfire claims — though Xactimate itself has never been successfully sued. Investors’ complaints differ: the valuation is rich (~28x trailing earnings) against growth that fell to ~3.9% organic in Q1 2026, and the AI-commoditization question hangs over the multiple, with Morgan Stanley and Evercore trimming targets to ~$216 and the stock down ~35% over the prior year. There is also latent regulatory risk — an insurance-data concentration this complete invites antitrust, FCRA, and state-regulator scrutiny — and employees cite recurring layoffs “despite record revenue.” The divestiture history cuts both ways: refocusing was value-accretive, but it concedes the 2010s diversification destroyed focus and had to be unwound.

Outlook: well positioned or at risk?

Well-positioned. Verisk is about as close to a structural monopoly as public markets offer in insurance: it owns industry-pooled data no competitor can rebuild, sells it as regulator-embedded standards (ISO forms, filed loss costs) and mission-critical software (Xactimate, cat models) to essentially every major U.S. P&C carrier, and books it as ~80%+ recurring revenue at ~56% EBITDA margins with ~$1.2B of free cash flow. The switching costs are not marketing — they are 50-state regulatory filings, decades of loss history, and workflows wired into carriers’ pricing and claims. Management’s 2022-2023 refocus (shedding Wood Mackenzie, Verisk Financial, and 3E) sharpened the asset rather than diluting it, and the cash returns — an 11% dividend hike and a $2.5B buyback in early 2026 — convert dominance into owner cash.

The honest risks are three, and none yet breaks the thesis. First, growth is slowing — organic revenue decelerated to ~3.9% in Q1 2026 — so a rich ~28x multiple leaves little room for disappointment, and the stock’s ~35% drawdown shows the market repricing that. Second, AI is a genuine long-term question: if models plus carrier-owned data ever substitute for pooled industry data, the moat narrows — but regulators’ insistence on representative, industry-wide data for rate adequacy is a powerful defense, and the likelier path is that AI runs on Verisk’s data. Third, the Xactimate underpayment backlash and insurance-data concentration invite litigation and antitrust exposure that could, in a harsher climate, constrain pricing power. Weigh them against the base rate — a regulator-blessed data utility every customer must use, growing mid-single digits at ~56% margins — and the call is not close: this position compounds. The debate is about the price of the stock, not the durability of the business.

How a challenger would attack it

Start where the monopoly has enemies. Verisk’s most attackable product is Xactimate, because one side of every transaction hates it: contractors allege its median-survey reconstruction pricing runs 20-40% below real storm-repair costs, and policyholder advocates document line-item manipulation in cases like Sheahan v. State Farm. A challenger builds the contractor-side estimating platform — live materials and labor pricing scraped from actual supplier transactions rather than lagging surveys, positioned as the audit layer that checks Xactimate’s numbers. That wedge monetizes the restoration industry’s grievance first, then becomes credible enough that plaintiff lawyers, public adjusters, and eventually regulators cite it — turning Verisk’s reference-price power into a liability. The second attack is the AI-plus-carrier-data play Verisk’s own bulls dismiss: the regulator-filed loss-cost moat protects ISO forms and rates, but it does not protect the analytics layered on top — fraud scoring, underwriting attributes, property hazard data — where LexisNexis and Cotality already have parity and where a model trained on a large carrier’s own book plus public data can substitute. Verisk’s growth already decelerated to ~3.9% organic in Q1 2026 at a ~28x multiple; a challenger doesn’t need to breach the core, only to cap the growth vector the valuation depends on.

Same playbook, new buyer

The Verisk playbook — industry-pooled data converted into regulator-embedded standards, sold back to contributors at 56% margins — is one of the great business models, and it is barely exported. The obvious transplant is other insurance geographies: no European or Asian market has an ISO equivalent with filed loss costs and standardized forms, partly because no McCarran-Ferguson-style pooling regime exists — which means the winning form there is a data consortium structured under local competition law, a build Verisk’s US-regulatory DNA and tuck-in-scale European strategy (Krug, Mavera, ~$10M deals) is not seriously attempting. The second shift is vertical: the pooled-loss-data mechanic fits any market where fragmented players individually lack credible loss history — cyber insurance is the live case, where no carrier’s book is large enough to price systemic risk and a trusted neutral aggregator could become the ISO of cyber within a decade. Verisk won’t move fast on either because its economics reward harvesting the existing monopoly — buybacks at $2.5B, dividend hikes — and because its founding asset, fifty years of US P&C history, contributes nothing to a cold-start pool.

Sources and further reading

Capital history

DateRoundAmountValuationLead(s)
1971-03 Formation (nonprofit) Insurer-contributed Consortium of P&C insurers merges rating bureaus into ISO under the McCarran-Ferguson antitrust exemption U.S. property-casualty insurance industry
1997 Conversion to for-profit corporation ISO converts from a nonprofit data cooperative to a for-profit corporation; founding carriers gradually relinquish control ISO / member insurers
2002 Acquisition — AIR Worldwide Undisclosed Adds catastrophe modeling; the foundation of today's Verisk cat-model franchise ISO / Verisk
2006-08 Acquisition — Xactware Undisclosed Adds property claims/repair estimating software — the future Xactimate platform ISO / Verisk
2009-10 IPO (Nasdaq: VRSK) ~$1.9B raised (85.25M shares at $22, above the $19-21 range) Largest U.S. IPO of 2009; a secondary sale letting insurer-owners cash out — Verisk itself received no primary proceeds Morgan Stanley, BofA Merrill Lynch (underwriters)
2022 Divestitures — Verisk Financial & 3E Undisclosed Sheds financial-services and environmental-health-and-safety units to refocus on insurance Verisk (Lee Shavel-led refocus)
2023-02 Divestiture — Wood Mackenzie (energy) $3.1B cash + up to $200M contingent Sold the energy-research business to Veritas Capital; completes the pivot to an insurance pure-play Veritas Capital (buyer)
2023-2024 European claims-tech tuck-ins Small (e.g., Rocket Enterprise Solutions ~$10.1M, 2024; Krug, Mavera, Morning Data, 2023) Bolt-ons expanding claims/underwriting digitalization across Germany, Austria, and the UK Verisk

Investors / owners: Institutional index and active managers (Vanguard, BlackRock, State Street and peers dominate the float, as with most large-cap Nasdaq names), Legacy insurer shareholders (the P&C carriers that founded ISO have largely sold down since the 2009 IPO), Sell-side coverage from Raymond James, Morgan Stanley, Evercore ISI, RBC, BMO, Baird, JPMorgan, Wells Fargo (2025-2026)

Competitive set

  • LexisNexis Risk Solutions (RELX) — The closest broad rival in insurance data. Owned by RELX, it supplies contributory databases, driver/claims histories (C.L.U.E.), identity and fraud analytics, and underwriting attributes to P&C and life carriers. It attacks Verisk in underwriting data and anti-fraud, the segments where pooled third-party data is most contestable, and is backed by a ~$70B-plus parent's data assets.
  • Cotality (formerly CoreLogic) — Property data and analytics for real estate, mortgage, and insurance, taken private by Stone Point and Insight in 2021 (~$8B) and rebranded Cotality in 2025. Competes directly in property risk, replacement-cost, and hazard data — the inputs behind homeowners underwriting and the reconstruction pricing that also underpins Xactimate.
  • Moody's RMS — Verisk's chief rival in catastrophe modeling, acquired by Moody's for ~$2B in 2021. RMS and Verisk's cat models are the two industry standards insurers and reinsurers run to price hurricane, earthquake, wildfire, and climate risk; Moody's balance sheet and analytics distribution make it the most credible challenger to Verisk's Extreme Event Solutions franchise.
  • CCC Intelligent Solutions (Nasdaq: CCCS) — The dominant estimating and workflow network for auto physical-damage claims — the automotive analog to Xactimate's property grip. CCC connects insurers, collision repairers, and parts suppliers, and its lock on auto claims is the main reason Verisk's estimating dominance is concentrated in property rather than the larger auto line.
  • TransUnion / data brokers — Credit bureaus and data brokers (TransUnion, Equifax, Experian) increasingly sell insurance-scoring, marketing, and verification data, chipping at the edges of underwriting analytics — though none replicates ISO's regulator-filed loss costs and standardized forms.
  • Guidewire / Duck Creek (core systems + data) — The P&C core-platform vendors are not head-on competitors but are strategically adjacent: as more carriers run on Guidewire or Duck Creek, those platforms accumulate policy and claims data and partner-ecosystem analytics that could, over time, disintermediate some Verisk data feeds.