Teardown

Retail · Deep dive

NCR Voyix Corporation

The 1884-founded cash-register originator, spun out of NCR Corp on 16 October 2023 as the pure-play retail-and-restaurant commerce software business, now trading around a ~$1.3B market cap on NYSE: VYX after selling its Digital Banking crown jewel to Veritas Capital for $2.45B in 2024 — a company shrinking its way to focus while Toast eats Aloha's hospitality installed base and cloud-native retail platforms erode its enterprise POS position.

at risk

NCR Voyix is bleeding share in both of its crown-jewel installed bases — Aloha hospitality to Toast and PAR, enterprise retail POS to GK Software and Oracle — while carrying the reputational scar of the 2023 Aloha ransomware outage and a market cap (~$1.3B) that has fallen roughly 90% below the company's pre-spin implied value, evidence that the Digital Banking sale bought balance-sheet relief but not a growth story.

My take

HQ
Atlanta, GA
Founded
1884 (National Cash Register Co., Dayton, OH) — modern entity re-formed as NCR Voyix Corporation via spin-off on 16 October 2023
Ownership
Public — NYSE: VYX
Funding
Public
Valuation
~$1.26-1.3B equity market cap; ~137.8M shares outstanding; share price ~$9.14 (September 2026), down from a post-spin opening range in the mid-teens (October 2023)
Revenue
$2.69B FY2025 (down 4.65% Y/Y from $2.82B FY2024); Software & Services revenue $1.99B FY2025; Q2 2026 revenue $523M (down 21% headline on hardware-transition runoff, +1% ex-hardware); FY2026 guidance of $2.188-2.303B revenue, $432-447M adjusted EBITDA (NCR Voyix Q2 2026 earnings, Q4/FY2025 earnings release)
Headcount
~13,500 (NCR Voyix FY2025 10-K)
Screen
Public incumbent with a meaningful tech component — $2.69B FY2025 revenue against a market cap below $1.5B, qualifying on the tech-forward EV threshold despite a depressed multiple
Published
2026-09-14
Web
www.ncrvoyix.com
Elsewhere
LinkedIn · Crunchbase

Founders and leadership

  • John H. Patterson Founder (1884, historical)

    Purchased the National Manufacturing Company of Dayton, Ohio in 1884 — maker of the first mechanical cash registers invented by James Ritty in 1879 — with brother Frank J. Patterson, and renamed it the National Cash Register Company. Pioneered aggressive, structured sales-force management and factory welfare programs that became templates for 20th-century American corporate practice. Ran NCR until his death in 1922.

  • James G. Kelly President & CEO (since 4 February 2025)

    CEO of EVO Payments, Inc. for roughly 12 years (2011-2023) until EVO's acquisition by Global Payments in March 2023. Joined NCR Voyix's board as Independent Chair in October 2023 at the spin, moved to Executive Chair in May 2024, then to President & CEO in February 2025, succeeding David Wilkinson (who departed after 14+ years at NCR). Payments-industry background rather than POS/retail-software background — the board's bet is that a payments operator can rebuild the platform-attach and payments-monetization story.

  • Michael D. Hayford CEO of legacy NCR Corp (April 2018 - 2023); architect of the Voyix/Atleos split

    Succeeded 13-year CEO Bill Nuti in April 2018. Oversaw the post-Nuti software transition and, under pressure to unlock value from a conglomerate straddling ATM hardware, banking software and retail/restaurant POS, championed the two-way separation announced September 2022 and completed 16 October 2023.

Snapshot

NCR Voyix is the retail-and-restaurant commerce software company left standing after NCR Corporation split itself into two public companies on 16 October 2023 — NCR Atleos taking the ATM/self-service-banking hardware business (NYSE: NATL), and NCR Voyix keeping retail POS, restaurant POS (Aloha) and, briefly, digital banking (NYSE: VYX). Fourteen months after the spin, Voyix sold that digital-banking segment to Veritas Capital for $2.45B (closed 30 September 2024, rebranded Candescent), using the proceeds to cut $1.84B of debt and obligations. What remains is a ~$2.69B-revenue (FY2025), ~13,500-employee company selling POS software, self-checkout, payments and back-office systems to restaurants and retailers — trading at roughly $1.3B market cap in September 2026, a fraction of the value implied at spin. The company is the direct descendant of the National Cash Register Company, founded in Dayton, Ohio in 1884, making it (by lineage) one of the oldest continuously operating technology brands in the teardown set — and one now fighting to defend 140-year-old customer relationships against cloud-native challengers a fraction of its age.

Founding story

The modern story that matters is not 1884, it’s 2018-2026. John Patterson’s National Cash Register Company invented much of 20th-century American sales culture — structured sales training, factory welfare programs, an aggressive acquisitive posture — and by his death in 1922 NCR dominated cash-register manufacturing globally. The company survived a century of technology transitions (mechanical registers to electronic POS to ATMs to enterprise software) under a sequence of corporate identities, arriving at the 21st century as a diversified hardware-and-software conglomerate straddling ATMs, retail POS, restaurant POS and digital banking.

Bill Nuti ran NCR from 2005 to 2018 and pushed the software pivot, positioning NCR as a solutions company rather than a hardware manufacturer. Michael Hayford succeeded him in April 2018 and inherited a business that public-market investors persistently undervalued as a hardware-heavy conglomerate — the classic sum-of-the-parts discount. Hayford’s answer, announced in September 2022, was to split the company into a bank-hardware business (Atleos) and a commerce-software business (Voyix). The separation completed 16 October 2023: Voyix shareholders of record received one Atleos share for every two Voyix shares, and both stocks began independent trading on 17 October 2023. The rationale was straightforward capital-markets logic — unlock two focused equity stories from one unfocused conglomerate. What actually happened is a cautionary tale for that thesis: rather than re-rating upward, standalone Voyix immediately ran into an accounting scandal, a ransomware aftermath, and secular share loss in both of its remaining core businesses, and traded down from a post-spin opening in the mid-teens to roughly $9 by September 2026.

How it works

NCR Voyix sells software and hardware that sit at the literal point where a retail or restaurant transaction happens, then monetizes the data and payments flow around that transaction.

Retail. A grocery or drug-store lane runs Voyix’s checkout software (the ENCOR/POS lineage descending from the 2012-2013 Retalix acquisition) on Voyix-supplied or third-party terminals, connected to a store controller that talks to inventory, pricing and promotions systems. Self-checkout units — a next-generation line completing global rollout through 2025 — use barcode scanning, computer vision and RFID signals together to authorize an unattended transaction, a meaningfully harder integration problem than a cashier-operated lane because the system must catch mis-scans and theft without a human in the loop.

Restaurant. Aloha, acquired via the 2011 Radiant Systems deal, runs on in-store terminals (traditionally Windows-based) that manage order entry, kitchen routing, table/tab management and end-of-day settlement, with a back-office layer (Aloha Insight/Pulse) for reporting across a multi-unit chain. The historical weakness — and the one that bit hardest in April 2023 — is that Aloha’s back-office and cloud-connected features (gift cards, the Pulse dashboard, online ordering) depend on NCR-hosted data-center infrastructure; when that infrastructure went down in the BlackCat ransomware attack, in-store card-present sales kept running locally but every cloud-dependent function broke simultaneously across thousands of locations.

Payments. Voyix Payments underwrites and processes the card transaction itself, capturing a basis-point take rate on top of the POS software license/subscription — the same “payments-attach” economics that Toast, Square and Shift4 build their entire business models around, but Voyix historically treated as a bolt-on to a hardware/software sale rather than the primary product.

Platform. The Voyix Commerce Platform (VCP), unveiled in a next-generation microservices form at NRF ‘26 (January 2026), is the company’s attempt to unify retail and restaurant applications on shared cloud infrastructure rather than the historically separate, acquisition-stitched Aloha/Retalix/Counterpoint codebases — the modernization effort that both defends against and implicitly concedes to the cloud-native competitive threat.

Product and business overview

Aloha (restaurant). The legacy Windows-based Aloha POS and the newer cloud-hosted “Aloha Essentials”/AlohaNext line, targeting full-service and quick-service restaurant chains. Company messaging claims more restaurant staff have been trained on Aloha than any other POS — a genuine, decades-deep installed-base moat, but one that is an asset only as long as operators don’t actively migrate off it.

Retail POS and self-checkout. Point-of-sale software and self-checkout hardware/software for grocery, drug and mass-merchandise retailers, descending from the Retalix acquisition; NCR Voyix retains a reported lead in new POS software installations, though GK Software (SAP-owned) has moved into second place and is closing the gap (Retail Optimiser, 2025-2026).

Voyix Payments. Unified in-store, forecourt (fuel/convenience) and online payment acceptance and processing.

Digital Commerce / e-commerce. Online ordering, kiosk and digital-menu integrations layered onto both the retail and restaurant lines.

Voyix Commerce Platform (VCP). The cloud/microservices unification layer announced January 2026, meant to let retail and restaurant applications share data, deployment infrastructure and AI features rather than running as separate acquired-company stacks.

What Voyix does not own: despite trade-press conflation, Aptos is an independent, PE-backed retail-software competitor, not an NCR Voyix brand — a distinction worth getting right given how often the two names appear in the same sentence.

Business model and pricing

Revenue splits into hardware (terminals, self-checkout units, printers — a declining, lower-margin, lumpy category the company is deliberately shrinking), software & services (licenses, cloud subscriptions, maintenance — $1.99B of FY2025’s $2.69B), and payments (a take-rate on processed volume). The FY2025 hardware runoff is intentional: management is trading hardware revenue for the reduce-lumpiness, increase-recurring-revenue mix shift that public-market software investors reward, which is why headline revenue in Q2 2026 fell 21% while ex-hardware revenue rose 1%.

Pricing on Aloha Essentials is customer-quote-based; third-party POS-comparison sites report roughly $1,000 per terminal for outright hardware purchase, or $0 upfront under a subscription-plus-payments-attach model — the same shift from capex to opex/take-rate that every legacy POS vendor is being forced through by Toast and Square’s all-inclusive SaaS-plus-processing pricing. Retail POS and self-checkout deals are enterprise-negotiated, multi-year contracts tied to store counts and lane counts, with recurring software/maintenance fees layered on top of the initial hardware/license sale — the classic enterprise-software renewal model, with switching costs anchored in staff training, back-office integration and payment-processor relationships rather than a superior product experience.

As of 31 December 2025, the company reported 80,000 “platform sites” (up 8% Y/Y) and more than 8,500 “payment sites” (up 4% Y/Y) — the two metrics management now emphasizes over raw revenue, itself a tell that the recurring/attach story is more flattering than the top line.

Traction over time

MetricFY2019FY2021 (standalone, restated)FY2022 (standalone)FY2023FY2024FY2025Q2 2026
Combined pre-spin NCR revenue$6.92B$7.16B$7.84Bn/a (spin completed)n/an/an/a
Voyix standalone revenuen/a~$3.69B~$3.17B~$2.8B+ (Digital Banking still included part-year)~$2.82B$2.69B$523M (quarter)
Software & Services revenuen/an/an/an/a$2.05B$1.99Bn/a
Platform sitesn/an/an/an/a~74,00080,000n/a
Payment sitesn/an/an/an/a~8,1508,500+n/a
Employeesn/an/an/an/an/a~13,500n/a
Market cap (period-end approx.)n/an/an/a~$2B (post-spin, Oct 2023)~$1.5-2B~$1.3-1.5B~$1.26B (Sep 2026)

Sources: NCR Voyix FY2025 and Q4 2025 earnings releases (26 February 2026); Q2 2026 earnings release and call; stockanalysis.com revenue history; company histories on pre-spin NCR combined revenue.

The pattern: pre-spin combined-company revenue grew steadily through 2019-2022 as NCR added back post-COVID hardware demand; standalone Voyix revenue has declined every year since the spin as the company divested Digital Banking and deliberately shed low-margin hardware, while management points to platform-site and recurring-revenue growth as the offsetting, harder-to-verify positive story. The market has not been convinced — VYX traded from an opening range in the mid-teens (October 2023) down to roughly $9 by September 2026, a decline that outpaces the revenue decline and reflects a genuine derating on durability of the remaining franchise.

Market analysis

The global POS market was estimated at $43-54B in 2025-2026 depending on scope, growing at a 13-20% CAGR toward $116-132B by 2030-2034 (Fortune Business Insights; various 2026 market reports), with restaurant POS software specifically at $12.4B (2025) growing to $13.4B (2026) and cloud POS the fastest-growing sub-segment at a 25% CAGR (2025-2030). The structural forces reshaping the category all cut against NCR Voyix’s historical strengths:

Competitive intel

Toast is the existential threat to Aloha. At ~$21.2B market cap and ~$6.8B TTM revenue (August 2026), Toast is roughly 16x NCR Voyix’s market cap despite the two companies serving overlapping restaurant-technology budgets — a valuation gap that reflects the market’s view of which company owns the growth curve. Toast wins primarily on SaaS-plus-payments economics and an AI-forward product cadence that converts independent and small-chain operators off Aloha continuously.

PAR Technology is a smaller but sharper enterprise threat, having displaced Aloha at large QSR accounts (Burger King, Subway) with its Brink cloud POS — evidence that even the enterprise segment Voyix considers defensible is not secure.

Block/Square, Fiserv’s Clover, and Shift4 attack from the payments side, bundling low-cost or free POS software with payments processing to win the SMB segment where NCR Voyix’s Aloha Essentials and Counterpoint products compete on price.

Oracle Retail (MICROS heritage) and GK Software (SAP-owned) attack the enterprise-retail flank; GK Software has specifically moved into the #2 new-installation position behind NCR Voyix in 2025-2026 trade data, meaning the company’s historical lead in the segment it is best known for is actively narrowing.

Diebold Nixdorf is a fellow post-distress legacy hardware/software incumbent (emerged from Chapter 11 in 2023) fighting for the same shrinking enterprise-retail hardware-refresh budgets — two wounded incumbents competing for a smaller pie rather than either taking clear share from cloud-native entrants.

Aptos is a frequently confused but genuinely independent PE-backed retail unified-commerce competitor that wins head-to-head retail POS RFPs against Voyix.

Lightspeed Commerce competes across both retail and hospitality mid-market, particularly in specialty verticals (golf, cannabis, full-service dining) that value a modern cloud UI over Aloha’s legacy interface.

History and evolution

What people say

The case for. Sell-side coverage retains a “Moderate Buy” consensus with a ~$15.64 average price target as of 2026 — well above the ~$9 trading price — reflecting a view that the balance-sheet cleanup (Digital Banking sale, $1.84B debt reduction) and the shift toward recurring software/payments revenue (platform sites +8% and payment sites +4% in FY2025) is a legitimate, underappreciated turnaround setup. Retail Optimiser’s 2025-2026 installed-base data still shows NCR Voyix leading new POS software installations outright, with GK Software only recently closing to second place — meaning Voyix retains real new-logo momentum in enterprise retail even as the market gets more competitive. Some Glassdoor reviewers describe “positive culture with outdated technology,” acknowledging cultural strengths even while flagging the tech-debt problem. Trade coverage of the January 2026 VCP launch was broadly positive on the modernization direction, if skeptical of the pace.

The complaints. Glassdoor rates NCR Voyix 2.8/5 across 416+ reviews (27% below the IT-industry average), with only 39% of employees willing to recommend the company to a friend; recurring themes include “losing market share,” multiple rounds of cost-cutting layoffs through 2025-2026 (one reviewer citing a “round 3” layoff in March 2026), and toxic-culture complaints tied directly to the instability. The April 2023 BlackCat ransomware attack remains a cited reputational scar in trade press comparing Aloha to Toast, given how directly cloud-dependent back-office functions failed simultaneously across the customer base. The February-March 2024 discovery of $23M in fraudulent disbursements and the resulting 10-K delay and material-weakness disclosure damaged credibility with investors just months after the spin was supposed to be a clean-slate re-rating event. A January 2026 analyst downgrade specifically cited doubts about whether AI-driven productivity initiatives will show up in the numbers fast enough, and Goldman Sachs cut its price target on the same concern. Toast’s 20%+ revenue growth against Voyix’s revenue decline is the single most-cited comparison in analyst notes on the hospitality side.

Outlook: well positioned or at risk?

At-risk. NCR Voyix is a company that has spent three years subtracting rather than adding: it subtracted the ATM business (2023 spin), subtracted Digital Banking (2024 sale), and is now watching its two remaining core franchises — Aloha in hospitality and enterprise checkout in retail — lose share to better-capitalized, faster-growing, cloud-native competitors. The Digital Banking sale was the correct capital-allocation decision (it de-levered the balance sheet and removed a segment where Voyix was not the structural leader), but it also removed the one segment that was genuinely differentiated and hard to replicate, leaving behind two commodity-adjacent categories — restaurant and retail POS — where switching costs are real but shrinking as cloud vendors make migration cheaper and faster than it was a decade ago.

The bull case rests on three things holding: platform-site and payment-site growth continuing (both grew single digits in FY2025), the VCP replatforming actually shipping features fast enough to slow Toast/PAR displacement in hospitality, and payments-attach economics improving margin even as hardware revenue shrinks. All three are plausible but none is yet proven at scale — Q2 2026’s 23% headline restaurant-segment revenue decline is a worse print than the “ex-hardware” framing wants investors to focus on, and GK Software’s climb to #2 in new retail POS installations says the enterprise-retail moat is eroding, not holding.

The bear case is simpler and, on the evidence, currently winning: Toast is 16x NCR Voyix’s market cap while directly targeting the same hospitality budget dollar, the 2023 ransomware attack and the 2024 accounting scandal both landed in the same 18-month window that was supposed to be Voyix’s clean post-spin start, and Glassdoor’s 2.8/5 rating with repeated layoff rounds through 2025-2026 signals internal instability that tends to precede, not follow, further customer attrition. Absent a demonstrable inflection in net-new hospitality logos or a stabilization of the restaurant-segment revenue line within the next two to three quarters, the structural direction is share loss managed by cost-cutting rather than share defense funded by reinvestment.

How to attack it

Do not attack NCR Voyix by building a better generic POS — Toast, PAR and Lightspeed have already proven that thesis and captured the obvious wedge. Attack the seams the incumbents haven’t fully worked yet.

Wedge 1: Aloha-to-cloud migration-as-a-service for multi-unit chains that are too large for Toast’s mid-market motion but too small to justify a from-scratch enterprise RFP. Toast’s playbook is built around independent and small-chain operators; the 50-500-unit regional chain still running Aloha is underserved by a true “lift-and-shift” migration product that preserves menu/franchise-configuration data while re-platforming onto modern cloud infrastructure. A team that specializes purely in Aloha data migration and franchise-specific configuration porting, sold as a wedge into the eventual full-platform swap, is a narrower, faster-to-build business than competing head-on as a full POS vendor.

Wedge 2: Headless POS APIs for unified grocery/convenience commerce. NCR Voyix, Oracle Retail and GK Software all still sell POS as a vertically integrated hardware-plus-software bundle. A headless, API-first checkout/payments layer that any grocery or convenience retailer can compose into their own app and self-checkout hardware — the Stripe-for-retail-checkout model — undercuts the bundled-sale economics that make Voyix retail deals sticky but slow to iterate.

Wedge 3: Payments-led POS giveaway aimed specifically at NCR Voyix’s SMB Counterpoint/Aloha Essentials base. Shift4 and Clover already run this playbook broadly; a narrower version targeting specifically the segment of Voyix’s installed base up for contract renewal (identifiable via public RFP and franchise-association channels) could win migrations purely on total-cost-of-ownership math.

Enumerated NCR Voyix weaknesses. (i) Aloha’s legacy Windows-based core is materially behind Toast’s cloud-native architecture on release cadence, per multiple 2025-2026 comparison reviews. (ii) The company’s own hardware revenue is declining by design, meaning its historical channel-partner and reseller relationships are being actively deprioritized — a channel a new entrant can pick up. (iii) The 2023 ransomware attack exposed a genuine architectural weakness: back-office/cloud functions and in-store transaction processing share failure domains. (iv) Glassdoor’s 2.8/5 rating and repeated 2025-2026 layoffs signal engineering-team churn, historically correlated with slower roadmap execution. (v) GK Software’s rise to #2 in new retail installations is a leading indicator, not a lagging one.

Adjacent-segment play

The most under-exploited adjacent play sitting on top of NCR Voyix’s transaction data is retail-media and data-monetization infrastructure for mid-market grocery and convenience chains — the Cooler Screens/Instacart Ads/Rokt model, but for the thousands of regional grocery and drug retailers too small to build their own ad-tech stack. NCR Voyix already sits at the checkout transaction layer for 80,000 platform sites; a productized, opt-in retail-media layer built on that existing checkout footprint (rather than a from-scratch ad-tech company needing to win POS integration deals first) has a genuine data-asset advantage a startup competitor would need years to replicate. Instacart Ads and Rokt already prove the demand side exists; the constraint is integration access, which NCR Voyix — or an attacker with API access into its installed base — already has.

A second adjacent play is international expansion of the payments-attach model into underbanked-merchant markets (Latin America, Southeast Asia) where cloud POS-plus-payments bundles (in the Clover/SumUp mold) are still being built out and a company with NCR’s brand recognition among mid-market grocery/restaurant buyers could license or white-label its VCP stack faster than building local trust from zero — though this requires capital and local payments-licensing work that favors an incumbent with existing bank relationships over a scrappy new entrant.

A third, narrower play is verticalized SMB POS-as-payments-rails for a single vertical NCR Voyix under-serves today — convenience/fuel forecourts, for instance, where Voyix has a presence but has not built a Toast-style vertical-specific feature set (loyalty-plus-fuel-rewards integration, EMV-at-the-pump compliance tooling). The wedge that does not generalize well: competing purely on enterprise-grocery unified commerce, where Oracle Retail’s balance sheet and GK Software’s SAP distribution make head-to-head competition capital-intensive for a new entrant with no existing enterprise-retail relationships.

Sources and further reading

Capital history

DateRoundAmountValuationLead(s)
1884 National Cash Register Company founded in Dayton, Ohio by John H. and Frank J. Patterson n/a n/a Patterson brothers
2005-2018 Bill Nuti CEO era — pivots NCR from hardware-heavy ATM/POS manufacturer toward software and SaaS; lays groundwork for Digital Insight and payments acquisitions n/a n/a n/a
2011-08-24 NCR completes acquisition of Radiant Systems for ~$1.2B, bringing the Aloha restaurant POS platform into the portfolio ~$1.2B n/a NCR Corporation
2012-2013 NCR acquires Retalix, a grocery/retail POS and supply-chain software provider, expanding the retail software stack that underlies today's Voyix retail platform ~$650M n/a NCR Corporation
2013-12 / 2014 NCR announces 'transformative' financial-services acquisitions — Digital Insight and Alaric Systems — building the Digital Banking segment later sold to Veritas Capital ~$1.65B (Digital Insight) plus Alaric n/a NCR Corporation
2022-09 NCR Corporation announces plan to split into two independent public companies n/a — corporate action n/a NCR board under Michael Hayford
2023-04 (12-17 April) BlackCat/ALPHV ransomware attack on an NCR data center takes the Aloha POS platform offline for a multi-day outage affecting thousands of restaurants n/a — cybersecurity incident n/a n/a
2023-10-16/17 Spin-off completed: NCR Atleos (ATM/self-service banking) begins independent trading as NYSE: NATL on 17 October 2023; NCR Voyix (retail, restaurant, digital banking) continues as NYSE: VYX. Voyix shareholders of record as of 2 October 2023 received 1 Atleos share for every 2 Voyix shares held n/a — spin-off n/a n/a
2024-02/03 Company discloses ~$23M of fraudulent disbursements from a company bank account predating year-end 2023, identifies material weaknesses in internal controls, and delays its FY2023 10-K filing ~$23M fraud identified n/a n/a
2024-08-06 Definitive agreement announced to sell the Digital Banking segment to Veritas Capital $2.45B cash + up to $100M contingent consideration n/a Veritas Capital
2024-09-30 Digital Banking sale closes; unit rebranded Candescent under Veritas ownership. NCR Voyix announces $1.84B reduction of debt and other obligations and terminates its trade receivables facility $2.45B proceeds; $1.84B debt/obligations reduced n/a Veritas Capital
2025-02-04 James G. Kelly (former EVO Payments CEO, then-Executive Chair) appointed President & CEO, succeeding David Wilkinson, who departs the company and board n/a — leadership n/a NCR Voyix board
2026-01-07 NCR Voyix unveils next-generation, microservices-based application suite on the Voyix Commerce Platform (VCP) at NRF '26, its clearest public statement of the cloud-replatforming strategy n/a — product launch n/a n/a
2026-Q2 (quarter ended 30 June 2026) Q2 2026 revenue $523M (-21% headline on hardware runoff, +1% ex-hardware); retail segment ex-hardware revenue +4%, recurring +6%; restaurant segment revenue -23% headline (-6% ex-hardware) on installation softness; FY2026 guidance reiterated at $2.188-2.303B revenue n/a n/a n/a

Investors / owners: Public float — no controlling shareholder since the 2023 spin, The Vanguard Group — ~7.66% of shares outstanding (Schedule 13G, Q1 2026), BlackRock — among the largest institutional holders; disclosed new/increased position, August 2026, First Pacific Advisors — ~3.90% of shares outstanding, one of the largest single institutional holders, State Street and other index/passive managers — standard S&P/Russell index-fund ownership post-spin, No disclosed activist campaign specifically against NCR Voyix post-spin; the pre-spin conglomerate-discount pressure that produced the Atleos/Voyix separation (2022-2023) is the closest analog to an activist-driven outcome

Competitive set

  • Toast, Inc. (TOST) — NYSE: TOST. ~$21.2B market cap and ~$6.8B trailing-12-month revenue (August 2026). Cloud-native, all-in-one restaurant platform (POS + payments + fintech + hardware) growing >20% annually primarily by converting independent and small-chain restaurants off legacy systems including Aloha. The single most acute threat to NCR Voyix's historic hospitality crown jewel — Toast's SaaS + embedded-payments model captures both software and payments economics that Aloha's legacy per-terminal license model does not.
  • Block, Inc. / Square — NYSE: XYZ. Square's POS-plus-payments bundle dominates the SMB/micro-merchant end of retail and food service that NCR Voyix's Aloha Essentials and Counterpoint products also target, with a self-serve onboarding motion NCR's channel-partner model cannot match at that price point.
  • Lightspeed Commerce — TSX/NYSE: LSPD. Cloud POS for retail and hospitality, particularly strong in specialty retail (golf, cannabis dispensaries) and full-service restaurants — competes directly with both Aloha and Voyix's retail POS in mid-market accounts.
  • Oracle Retail (Xstore, MICROS heritage) — Oracle's retail unit, built partly on the MICROS acquisition (2014, ~$5.3B), competes for large-format grocery, drug and department-store POS and unified-commerce contracts — the same enterprise-retail accounts (Kroger-tier grocers, big-box) where NCR Voyix's ENCOR/checkout platform has historically been strong. Oracle's balance sheet lets it underprice or bundle retail modules against Oracle's broader ERP/cloud stack.
  • Diebold Nixdorf (DBD) — Diebold Nixdorf competes with NCR Voyix across retail POS hardware/software and lists NCR Voyix, Aptos, GK Software and Oracle as its own named retail-market rivals — the two companies chase the same shrinking enterprise-retail hardware-refresh cycle, both under balance-sheet pressure (Diebold emerged from Chapter 11 in 2023).
  • GK Software (SAP-owned) — German unified-commerce POS vendor, now under SAP, reported by Retail Optimiser (2025-2026) to have moved into second place behind NCR Voyix for new POS software installations — direct evidence NCR Voyix's new-logo lead in enterprise retail POS is narrowing, not widening.
  • Aptos, LLC — Independent (formerly Triversity/Epicor Retail lineage, PE-backed) retail unified-commerce and POS software provider — a direct named competitor to NCR Voyix in retail POS deals, not an NCR-owned brand, despite occasional conflation of the two in trade coverage.
  • PAR Technology (PAR) — NYSE: PAR. Cloud restaurant POS (Brink) and drive-thru/back-office software, aggressively winning enterprise QSR logos (Burger King, Subway) that historically ran Aloha — a smaller but faster-growing enterprise-focused Aloha displacement threat than Toast, which skews independent/mid-market.
  • Fiserv (FI) / Clover — Fiserv's Clover POS platform bundles payments processing with a low-cost SMB POS terminal, competing with NCR Voyix Counterpoint and Aloha Essentials in the small-merchant segment, backed by Fiserv's massive merchant-acquiring distribution.
  • Shift4 Payments (FOUR) / Global Payments (GPN) — Payments-first companies pushing upmarket into POS software (Shift4's SkyTab, Global Payments' Xenial/Heartland POS) — both attack NCR Voyix's payments-attach economics by leading with processing margin and giving away or subsidizing the POS software layer, undercutting Voyix's per-terminal license model.