Retail · Deep dive

Casey's General Stores, Inc.

The fourth-largest US convenience-store chain, built on a rural whitespace nobody else wanted — one gas-station-plus-pizza box in each of ~2,500 small towns, 100% company-operated, selling more pizzas per store than Papa John's.

well positioned

Being the only c-store in ~2,500 small towns, owning every location (no franchisees to fight), and running a scaled prepared-food kitchen no online player can copy gives Casey's a compounding, hard-to-attack moat; the only downgrade paths are (1) EV adoption and rural depopulation shrinking the fuel-and-trip base under it, and (2) Kwik Trip and Maverik pushing the same 'company-operated + prepared food' model into Casey's home Midwest at the same time.

My take ★★ Very interesting ★ Interesting − Maybe ✗ Not interesting

Snapshot

Casey’s General Stores is the fourth-largest convenience-store chain in the United States and the largest c-store operator focused on rural America — roughly 2,900 stores in about 2,500 small towns across 20 states after closing the $1.145B Fikes/CEFCO acquisition on November 1, 2024. It is also, quietly, one of the country’s largest pizza chains: Casey’s sells more pizzas per store than Papa John’s and is often cited as the fifth-largest pizza chain in the US by unit volume. FY2025 (year ended April 30, 2025) delivered record results — total revenue near $15.9B, net income $546.5M (+8.9%), diluted EPS $14.64, EBITDA $1.2B (+13.3%) — with inside same-store sales up 2.6% on top of tough comps. It matters now because Rebelez’s playbook (buy the CEFCO footprint, push into the South, layer prepared food and loyalty on top of every store) has re-rated Casey’s from a boring gas-station chain into a mid-cap growth compounder trading around 25-30x earnings — a valuation that only works if the rural moat and food attach hold up against Maverik, Kwik Trip, and the long arc of EV adoption.

Founding story

The origin is a Standard Oil station in Des Moines, Iowa. In 1959, 22-year-old Donald Lamberti took over the “Square Deal” gas station his father Kurvin had run, and spent the next decade selling gasoline and figuring out that the real money in a small-town filling station was the groceries in the back. In 1968 Lamberti partnered with a jobber and family friend named Kurvin C. Fish to buy a rural Iowa store from a distributor named Casey, kept the name, and opened the first Casey’s-branded location on November 20, 1968 in Boone, Iowa. The wedge was demographic: there were thousands of rural Iowa, Missouri, and Illinois towns of 500-5,000 people with no c-store, no supermarket, and one aging gas station — a market Standard Oil, 7-Eleven, and every regional grocer had ignored as too small to justify the real estate and staffing math. Lamberti built the model to fit them.

Two decisions from that era became the moat. First, Lamberti refused to franchise. Every Casey’s store is company-owned and company-operated, on land Casey’s owns or leases directly. In an industry defined by franchisee-versus-corporate friction (7-Eleven, Circle K), that ownership structure means one merchandising plan, one supply chain, and one P&L. Second, in the mid-1980s Casey’s put pizza ovens in its stores — a decision that looked absurd for a c-store at the time and turned out to be the single highest-margin, highest-differentiation product in the company. Casey’s went public on NASDAQ in 1983 as a ~300-store regional chain, hit the S&P 400 mid-caps, weathered a 2010 hostile bid from Alimentation Couche-Tard at $36/share (roughly 6% of today’s price), and Lamberti did not fully step off the board until 2006. Darren Rebelez took over as CEO in June 2019 with a QSR operator’s playbook — loyalty, digital, prepared food, third-party delivery — and turned the box that had been a gas station into a box that was a restaurant that happened to sell gas.

How it works

A Casey’s store is a ~4,000-5,500 square-foot box on cheap rural land, with a fuel canopy out front, a walk-in cooler wall, and — critically — an in-store pizza kitchen with fresh-dough ovens along the back wall. The location strategy is the moat: Casey’s targets towns of ~500 to ~20,000 people where it is often the only convenience store, the only pizza restaurant, and effectively the only 24-hour retail of any kind for miles. The company has publicly said roughly half its stores are in towns of fewer than 5,000 people, and it operates in about 2,500 different rural communities. Building a competing store would require finding a rural site, building infrastructure, and expecting to split trips with Casey’s in a market that only supports one — a per-town economic barrier that scales.

The operational loop is trip frequency driven by three attach layers stacked on the fuel stop. Fuel gets the customer to the pump, at margins in the ~30-40 cent per gallon range that are cyclical but industry-competitive. Inside sales are where the money is made: grocery and general merchandise (soft drinks, snacks, tobacco, alcohol, packaged food) at ~30-35% gross margin, and prepared food and dispensed beverages (pizza, breakfast pizza, sandwiches, donuts, coffee, fountain) at ~60%+ gross margin. Every store runs the same standardized pizza kitchen — Casey’s bakes fresh pies in-house rather than reheating frozen — and pizza is both the traffic driver and the halo. Four company-owned distribution centers in Iowa, Indiana, Missouri, and Arkansas (plus expanded southern capacity picked up with Fikes) supply the network on Casey’s own trucks. Casey’s Rewards is the data layer sitting on top: a national loyalty program launched in 2020, integrated with the mobile app, first-party delivery, DoorDash, and Uber Eats — and used to identify the ~40%+ of transactions that come from repeat pizza and prepared-food buyers.

Product and business overview

Fuel. Roughly 60% of total revenue but under a third of gross profit. Casey’s sells gasoline and diesel at nearly every store, competes on price with the local Kum & Go/Maverik/BP, and uses fuel loyalty (a Casey’s Rewards fuel discount) as the hook for inside-store trips. Fuel-margin volatility is the biggest quarter-to-quarter earnings swing in the business and the primary reason CASY trades cheaper than pure QSR comps.

Grocery and general merchandise. The core inside-store category — soft drinks, salty snacks, packaged food, beer, wine, cigarettes, other tobacco, candy, groceries, HBA. Non-discretionary and habit-driven, sold at ~32-35% margin, growing on price and unit at low-single digits with a private-label push (Casey’s own brands across snacks, water, coffee).

Prepared food and dispensed beverages. The strategic engine. Whole and slice pizza (including breakfast pizza), sandwiches, subs, appetizers, bakery, donuts, coffee, fountain and dispensed drinks — sold at ~60%+ gross margin. Prepared food is roughly 10-11% of total revenue but a much larger share of gross profit, and the category the market pays for. Casey’s is regularly cited among the top five US pizza chains by unit volume, and its per-store pizza attach is higher than Papa John’s on a same-basis measure.

Casey’s Rewards and digital. A national loyalty program with tens of millions of members, tied to the Casey’s mobile app, order-ahead pickup, first-party home delivery in select markets, and integrations with DoorDash and Uber Eats. The rewards program is the personalization engine that lets Casey’s target coupons at pizza customers and habit-form the app-order pizza trip.

Real estate. Every store is company-operated. Casey’s owns the majority of its store real estate outright rather than leasing, which is unusual in c-store and worth flagging: it means the balance sheet carries billions in owned land and buildings and the P&L doesn’t pay rent — a structural cost advantage over franchise-heavy competitors and a hidden asset value against the equity market cap.

Wholesale, fleet cards, dealer supply. A small but growing dealer-fuel supply business inherited and expanded from Fikes’ Texas wholesale operation, plus a fleet-card program (Casey’s Business Fuel Card) targeting small local businesses and independent operators.

Business model and pricing

Casey’s books revenue as a straight-line retailer across three lines: fuel (~60% of sales, single-digit gross margin percent but ~30-40 cent/gallon absolute margin), grocery and general merchandise (~30% of sales, ~32-35% gross margin), and prepared food and dispensed beverages (~10-11% of sales, ~60%+ gross margin). Operating margin runs high-single digits on a big absolute base; EBITDA in FY2025 was ~$1.2B on ~$15.9B of revenue. Because prepared food margin is roughly double grocery and roughly ten times fuel margin percent, every point of prepared-food mix growth is disproportionately valuable — the reason Rebelez’s playbook is engineered around it.

Fuel pricing follows the local competitive set, day-part-adjusted; Casey’s does not try to be the cheapest gallon in town but competes on the loyalty fuel discount (typically 3¢-10¢ per gallon for rewards members). Inside pricing is everyday-value with periodic promotions; the pizza menu runs national QSR-adjacent price points (large one-topping pizza in the $12-15 range, breakfast pizza slightly higher) that beat delivery-only competitors on both quality and speed in the towns Casey’s operates in. The Rewards program funds targeted offers rather than blanket discounts, which is a materially better margin structure than the 30%-off national pizza chains have to run.

Capital allocation is the least glamorous, most consequential decision the board makes. Casey’s funds new-store growth (~50-70 organic openings a year at ~$5-6M all-in per store, including land), pays a modest and growing dividend, opportunistically buys back stock, and periodically does a big M&A deal (Buchanan Energy 94-store Bucky’s for ~$580M in 2021; Fikes/CEFCO 198-store for $1.145B in 2024). Debt is used but the balance sheet stays investment-grade; Casey’s has never done a leveraged recap and treats its owned real estate as a strategic asset rather than a source of sale-leaseback financing.

Traction over time

The shape is what matters. Revenue tripled from ~$5B a decade earlier to ~$16B, but the more important number is store count: Casey’s added roughly 750 stores over the six years from FY2019 to FY2025 — a ~35% unit increase in a category most investors assumed was saturated. The company reported that FY2025 was the largest single-year store additions in its history at 270 stores built or acquired, of which 198 were the CEFCO deal and the balance a mix of new-builds and small tuck-ins. Inside same-store sales of +2.6% in FY2025 on top of tough comps signal the prepared-food strategy is actually working, not just the M&A. Net income growth of ~9% on flat-ish organic revenue in an inflationary fuel environment is the outperformance the market pays for.

The unit-economics story is that a mature Casey’s store generates something in the $4-5M annual revenue range and ~$700K-$900K of store-level EBITDA, with prepared food and inside margin doing the heavy lifting. New-store payback runs in the 3-5 year range on land the company typically owns, and the acquired CEFCO stores are being remerchandised to the Casey’s prepared-food model over FY2026-2027 — a lift management has guided to but not yet fully proven.

Market analysis

The US convenience-store industry generates roughly $850B in annual sales across ~150,000 stores (NACS estimates), of which about 60% is fuel and 40% is inside sales. The category is highly fragmented: the top ten chains combined operate fewer than a third of US stores, and roughly 60% of US c-stores are single-store operators. That fragmentation is the strategic runway. Casey’s operates in ~20 states with ~2,900 stores; the equivalent white-space in the US is closer to ~5,000 rural towns of 500-20,000 people that could support a c-store and are not currently served by a scaled operator.

Three forces move the market. First, fuel volume is in slow secular decline as vehicle fuel economy improves and EVs take share — a headwind Casey’s is exposed to on the fuel P&L and defends against with inside mix. The offsetting bull case is that rural America adopts EVs later and less than the coastal averages, and rural gasoline volumes are the last to erode. Second, prepared food is the industry’s structural growth vector: c-store food-service revenue has grown mid-to-high single digits for a decade while grocery and tobacco have flatlined, and NACS data show prepared food is now the highest-gross-profit category in the average c-store. Third, industry consolidation is accelerating — 7-Eleven’s parent Seven & i has been the subject of Couche-Tard’s largest-ever bid; Maverik-plus-Kum & Go closed in 2023; Sun Belt operators are being rolled up — and Casey’s is both a consolidator (CEFCO) and, theoretically, a target if the founder-era shareholder base ever turns over. The macro exposure Casey’s doesn’t like to talk about is rural population trends: net domestic migration is still slightly negative for a majority of the counties Casey’s operates in, and the moat is worth less if the moat’s customer base is aging out.

Competitive intel

The competitive picture is bifurcated. On the fuel-and-pump layer, Casey’s competes with everything from Circle K to independent single-store operators; on price alone it wins on scale efficiency and loses on land cost only to Buc-ee’s and Costco fuel. On the prepared-food and inside-store layer — where the money is — the peer set narrows sharply to the elite c-store operators: Wawa and Sheetz on the East Coast, QuikTrip in the Sun Belt, Kwik Trip in the Upper Midwest, and Buc-ee’s in Texas and the Southeast. All are private, all have strong food operations, and only Kwik Trip attacks the same rural Midwest geography as Casey’s. Kwik Trip’s vertical integration — its own dairy, bakery, and meat plants — makes it arguably the only c-store in America that beats Casey’s on food margin, and it competes head-to-head in Iowa, Wisconsin, and Minnesota.

Maverik’s 2023 acquisition of Kum & Go is the single most consequential recent competitive event. Kum & Go was the number-two rural Midwest c-store chain, Casey’s’s most direct look-alike, and was based across the street from Casey’s in Des Moines. Maverik combined it with its own ~400 Western stores, added the BonFire prepared-food kitchen, and now runs ~780 stores directly overlapping Casey’s home markets. The threat is not scale; the threat is the operating model — a company-op prepared-food-forward chain running the exact same playbook, funded by private capital that doesn’t need quarterly earnings. The next three years of Casey’s same-store food comps in Iowa and Nebraska will be the read on how much share Maverik is actually taking.

Circle K (Couche-Tard) is the industry consolidator. The 2010 hostile bid at $36/share is the deal Casey’s shareholders often talk about but rarely price into risk — Couche-Tard has shown repeatedly (7-Eleven bid, Speedway pursuit, EG Group US) that it will pay for scaled US c-store operators, and if Casey’s ever became willing, Circle K is the natural buyer. 7-Eleven is a scale peer but not a rural competitor. Buc-ee’s in Texas is a growing competitive presence at the new Fikes/CEFCO footprint, though its 100+-pump travel-plaza model is a different animal from Casey’s small-town box. Dollar General’s continued expansion into fresh food and its early gas-fuel pilots are the sleeper threat: same rural footprint, national scale, and a cost structure that could plausibly attach a c-store layer at 20,000+ locations.

History and evolution

• 1959 — Donald Lamberti, age 22, takes over his father Kurvin’s “Square Deal” Standard Oil gas station in Des Moines, Iowa.
• 1968 — Lamberti and Kurvin C. Fish buy a rural Iowa store from a distributor named Casey; the first Casey’s-branded store opens November 20 in Boone, Iowa.
• 1980s — Casey’s installs pizza ovens across its store base — the differentiating decision.
• October 1983 — IPO on NASDAQ (ticker CASY); the company is a ~300-store regional chain.
• 1990s-2000s — Steady rural expansion across Iowa, Missouri, Illinois, Nebraska, Kansas, and adjacent states; Casey’s crosses 1,500 stores.
• 2006 — Don Lamberti retires from the chairman’s seat; Bob Myers takes over as CEO.
• April-September 2010 — Alimentation Couche-Tard launches a $36-per-share (~$1.9B) unsolicited bid for Casey’s; the board and shareholders reject it after a bruising proxy fight; Couche-Tard eventually walks. Casey’s stock now trades at ~15x that offer.
• 2011-2018 — Terry Handley era: continued store growth to ~2,100 locations; loyalty and digital efforts remain limited.
• June 2019 — Darren Rebelez becomes CEO; launches investor-day plan around prepared food, loyalty, digital, and store growth.
• 2020 — National Casey’s Rewards loyalty program launches; COVID drives rural c-store demand up but pressures fuel volume.
• August 2021 — Casey’s closes the $580M acquisition of Buchanan Energy’s Bucky’s — 94 stores across Nebraska and Illinois, at the time the largest deal in company history.
• 2022 — Acquires 40 Circle K stores in Oklahoma from Couche-Tard; total store count crosses 2,450.
• June 2023 — Investor Day plan sets a target to add ~500 net stores by FY2026, expand prepared-food attach, and grow inside same-store comps mid-single digits.
• 2023 — Kroger Fuel-Points partnership expanded, letting Kroger loyalty members redeem points at Casey’s fuel pumps.
• August 2024 — Casey’s announces the $1.145B acquisition of Fikes Wholesale, owner of 198-store CEFCO chain (148 Texas plus AL/FL/MS), the largest deal in company history.
• November 1, 2024 — Fikes/CEFCO acquisition closes; the CEFCO brand is retired over the following year; store count crosses ~2,900.
• June 2025 — Casey’s reports record FY2025 results: revenue ~$15.9B, net income $546.5M (+8.9%), EPS $14.64 (+9.0%), EBITDA $1.2B (+13.3%), inside same-store sales +2.6%, 270 stores added — the most in company history.

What people say

The case for. Bulls point to a moat that most retail investors underestimate: Casey’s is the only convenience store in ~2,500 rural towns, and roughly 50% of stores are in towns of fewer than 5,000 people — a footprint no online competitor can attack because the last-mile economics of a $12 pizza and a 20-oz soda do not work over Amazon or DoorDash for a customer 15 minutes from town. Every store is company-operated, which means one merchandising plan and no franchisee drag; the pizza operation is a genuinely scaled QSR nobody in c-store has copied at the same quality; and Rebelez’s post-2019 execution — loyalty program, mobile app, DoorDash/UberEats integration, CEFCO integration — has been rated among the best operator performances in mid-cap retail. Sell-side analysts cite Casey’s ability to raise inside comps in the mid-single digits through the 2022-2025 inflation cycle without losing traffic. Employee reviews on Glassdoor sit around 3.6-3.7/5, with recurring positive themes about tenure, benefits, and pension — better than most c-store peers and materially better than 7-Eleven’s franchise-store reviews. The 2010 rejected Couche-Tard bid is the single most-cited case study of Casey’s board getting a big capital decision right.

The complaints. The critiques are real. On the employee side, Glassdoor and Indeed complaints cluster on pace, understaffing at rural stores, and store-manager turnover — the pizza operation is labor-intensive and rural hiring is a chronic constraint; the pension freeze and 401(k) transition drew persistent criticism. Reddit threads on r/CaseysGeneralStores and rural-Iowa subreddits describe long lines, pizza quality drift at understaffed stores, mobile-order breakdowns during dinner rush, and the standard c-store cadre of grievances about cleanliness and bathroom access. The bear case on the financials is more structural: (1) fuel volume is in secular decline, and rural EV adoption — while later than coastal — will eventually erode gallons per store, tightening the fuel margin cushion that funds inside growth; (2) rural depopulation is a real headwind in the specific counties Casey’s operates in, and the moat is worth less if the customer base is shrinking; (3) Maverik + Kum & Go now competes head-to-head in the home Midwest with a nearly identical prepared-food-plus-loyalty playbook, and Casey’s food attach is the single most-important-to-defend metric; (4) the CEFCO integration is only partly complete — remerchandising 198 Texas/Southeast stores to a Casey’s prepared-food kitchen is a multi-year lift, and Texas is Buc-ee’s home turf; (5) the stock is priced like a compounder at ~25-30x forward earnings, so any comp miss or fuel-margin compression triggers a sharp drawdown. Short reports have specifically flagged the tension between the market’s growth-multiple valuation and the flat-to-declining nature of a small-town rural US customer base.

Outlook: well positioned or at risk?

Well-positioned — because the three pillars of the moat compound rather than erode. First, being the only c-store in ~2,500 rural towns is a per-town monopoly economics no scaled competitor is going to unwind: Maverik can pick off a couple hundred markets, Kwik Trip defends a specific Upper Midwest patch, but no one is going to build 2,000 rural c-stores in the towns Casey’s has already claimed. Second, the 100% company-operated model — no franchisees — is the reason Casey’s can run a national prepared-food operation at consistent quality when 7-Eleven and Circle K cannot; that operational advantage grows more valuable, not less, as food attach becomes the industry’s only real growth vector. Third, the CEFCO integration gives Casey’s a real Southern platform for the first time — Texas, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi — from which the same rural-whitespace playbook can run for another decade before running out of runway.

The honest risks are two, and they are the only conditions under which this verdict flips to at-risk. First, if Maverik plus Kwik Trip meaningfully take same-store food and traffic share in the home Midwest across a two-year window — i.e., Casey’s inside same-store growth drops below +1% while competitors add units in Iowa/Nebraska/Missouri — the moat’s single most valuable layer is being priced away. Employee-review data and Reddit complaints already flag pace/turnover issues that a better-capitalized competitor could exploit. Second, if rural EV penetration accelerates faster than the industry base case — say, above 15% of new-vehicle sales in Casey’s operating states by FY2028 — the fuel-margin cushion tightens materially and the small-town depopulation trend compounds, breaking the trip-frequency math that funds the rest of the box. Neither condition is here yet. Both are trackable in a two- to three-year window. On the central test — defensible and improving, or ripe for share loss — Casey’s is clearly the former, and the uncomfortable part is only that the market has now noticed, priced it at a growth-stock multiple, and left less room for error on execution.

How to attack it

The wedge is not head-to-head c-store retail — that game requires 2,000+ stores of capital before the loyalty flywheel starts. The wedge is a rural-focused prepared-food delivery marketplace that displaces Casey’s pizza attach without owning the box. In the ~2,500 towns Casey’s operates in, Casey’s is often the only restaurant open past 8pm and often the only pizza in town, but its own delivery is patchy and its DoorDash/Uber Eats integration is a national deal that doesn’t match rural driver density. A challenger builds a rural-first delivery marketplace with local-driver density (think DoorDash’s original SMB density strategy, but rural), aggregates independent pizza places, local diners, and small-town chains, and layers Casey’s’s own food as a supply-side node — capturing the last-mile relationship and turning Casey’s kitchen into a wholesaler. The tech is not hard; the capital is not enormous; the moat Casey’s built (physical rural boxes) is exactly what the challenger doesn’t need to duplicate.

The specific weaknesses to exploit: (1) Capital-intensive 100%-owned model — Casey’s owns its stores, which is a P&L advantage in good times and a rigidity in bad times; a challenger with an asset-light aggregator model can attack any subset of towns without matching Casey’s real-estate cost structure. (2) Midwest ag-cycle exposure — Casey’s traffic correlates to farm income, and the 2025-2026 farm-cycle downturn already showed up in the numbers; a challenger diversified across rural regions has less concentration risk. (3) EV mix risk — Casey’s has begun EV charging pilots but is structurally slow; a challenger built around a fuel-independent value prop is agnostic to the transition. (4) No franchise leverage — the 100%-owned model that is Casey’s operational advantage is also a growth constraint; the company cannot scale to 5,000 stores in five years the way a franchise chain could, and that’s the runway a well-funded attacker can occupy. (5) Rural digital experience — first-party mobile app is functional but not best-in-class; reviews complain of order-ahead failures and pizza-track inaccuracy at peak hours. (6) Homogeneous merchandising — every Casey’s runs the same national plan; a challenger can hyperlocalize (regional beers, local pizza brands, farm-store partnerships) in a way Casey’s central merchandising deliberately does not.

Adjacent-segment play

The most credible adjacent bet is Casey’s kitchen-as-a-service — take the operational IP of the prepared-food kitchen (pizza system, breakfast pizza, sandwich program, dough supply, ovens, staffing model, POS integration) and license it as a turnkey QSR module to the ~60,000 US independent c-stores and small rural grocers that will never build their own scaled food operation but are being outcompeted by scaled c-store food. Domino’s built its entire second act as a supply-chain business selling to its own franchisees; Casey’s could build a third-party version selling dough, cheese, toppings, kitchen equipment, training, and a co-branded (or white-label) rural pizza program to single-store c-store operators and rural grocers. The buyer exists (fragmented, desperate, out-attached by scaled operators); the tech exists (Casey’s already runs a proprietary POS and supply chain); the capability is a real asset (in-house commissary discipline, recipe IP, kitchen ergonomics). A standalone rural-QSR delivery brand — think “Domino’s for the towns Domino’s won’t serve” — is the same wedge from a different starting point: use ghost-kitchen space, license from Casey’s or build in parallel, focus on the 2,500-town whitespace between the c-store operators, and monetize the delivery relationship the physical box cannot economically own. Neither wedge requires Casey’s-scale capital, and both attack the layer of the business Casey’s has explicitly kept in-house rather than distributing.

Sources and further reading

• Casey’s Announces Fourth Quarter and Fiscal Year 2025 Results — Casey’s Investor Relations, June 9, 2025. FY2025 revenue $15.94B, net income $546.5M (+8.9%), EPS $14.64, EBITDA $1.2B (+13.3%), inside same-store sales +2.6%; 270 stores added — most in company history.
• Casey’s delivers record fiscal year 2025 with net income up 8.9% — Retail Insight Network, June 2025. Independent coverage of FY2025 record results and Fikes/CEFCO integration.
• Casey’s Announces the Closing of the Fikes Wholesale Acquisition — Casey’s Investor Relations, November 5, 2024. $1.145B cash close on 198 CEFCO stores across TX, AL, FL, MS.
• Casey’s to acquire CEFCO for $1.1B — C-Store Dive, August 2024. Deal announcement, geographic breakdown, strategic rationale.
• 73-year-old convenience store brand disappears after sale to Casey’s General Store — TheStreet, 2025. CEFCO brand retirement, integration timeline.
• Casey’s Gives CEFCO Acquisition Update in Latest Earnings Report — CSP Daily News, 2025. Integration progress and prepared-food remerchandising.
• Casey’s General Stores (CASY) Revenue 2006-2025 — Stock Analysis, 2025. Time series of revenue and store count over two decades.
• Casey’s General Stores 10-K, Annual Report Fiscal 2025 — Casey’s General Stores, Inc., filed 2025. Segment breakdown, store count, real estate ownership, risk factors.
• Casey’s General Stores 8-K Q4 FY2025 press release — SEC EDGAR, June 2025. Statutory FY2025 results filing.
• Casey’s highlights strong sales, traffic growth in latest earnings report — CSP Daily News, 2025-2026. Post-close operating cadence and same-store food metrics.