Supply chain — global agricultural commodities origination, trading and processing · Deep dive

Bunge Global SA

One of the four legacy 'ABCD' global grain traders (ADM, Bunge, Cargill, Louis Dreyfus), now recast by the 2 July 2025 close of the $34B Viterra merger into a scaled origination-and-processing platform running pro-forma toward $60-67B of revenue against a ~$14B market cap — a 208-year-old physical commodities incumbent trying to reset its moat as post-2022 crush margins normalize hard and ADM's January 2024 accounting scandal re-priced the entire sector's multiple.

at risk

Post-Viterra scale is real, but structural margin normalization, ADM-scandal-driven multiple compression, unresolved Cerrado/EUDR exposure, and a well-funded attacker cohort disintermediating origination together outweigh the moat the deal was supposed to buy.

My take ★★ Very interesting ★ Interesting − Maybe ✗ Not interesting

Snapshot

Bunge Global SA is one of the four legacy global grain traders — the “ABCD” oligopoly of Archer-Daniels-Midland, Bunge, Cargill and Louis Dreyfus — and, since the 2 July 2025 close of its roughly $34B acquisition of Viterra, arguably the world’s largest by combined origination and processing footprint. Q2 2026 (the first full post-close quarter) posted $24.0B of net sales, up 88% year over year, and adjusted segment EBIT of $796M, more than double a year earlier, prompting management to raise FY2026 adjusted EPS guidance to $9.25-9.75. The company sits at a paradoxical valuation: pro-forma revenue in the $60-67B range against a market capitalization of roughly $14B in September 2026 — a 0.2-0.3x sales multiple that reflects both the structural low margins of physical commodities trading and the market’s uncertainty that Viterra can rebuild a moat the ADM scandal and post-2022 margin normalization eroded. Founded in Amsterdam in 1818, redomiciled to Switzerland in November 2023, and headquartered operationally in Chesterfield, Missouri, Bunge earns its money from origination (buying grain from farmers), logistics (moving it via port, silo, barge and rail), and processing (crushing oilseeds into meal and edible/industrial oils). It is a business the market has been assigning trader-cycle multiples to for a decade — and increasingly asking whether AI-native ag intel and farmer-direct marketplaces will erode from the front.

Founding story

Bunge’s origin is 208 years old and predates most of the modern commodities industry. The firm was founded in 1818 in Amsterdam by Johann Peter Gottlieb Bunge as a colonial import/export house dealing in grains, hides and coffee. His grandson Edouard Bunge relocated the family firm to Antwerp in 1859 and made it a serious European grain trader. In 1884 the family founded Bunge y Born in Buenos Aires — the Argentine trading and industrial arm that would make the group a global grain and oilseed power for the next century. Brazilian expansion followed in 1905 and eventually became the single largest country operation. The firm went public on the New York Stock Exchange in 2001 under the ticker BG, and — as an artifact of favorable tax and corporate law — first incorporated in Bermuda before redomiciling to Switzerland as Bunge Global SA in November 2023, which is where the “SA” (société anonyme) suffix comes from.

The story that matters more for how the current Bunge behaves, though, is the 2018-2019 activist campaign. Continental Grain Company — Paul Fribourg’s family firm, and the shell of the original Continental Grain trading house that ran alongside Bunge, Cargill and Dreyfus for most of the twentieth century before selling most of itself to Cargill in 1999 — disclosed a roughly 1% stake in Bunge in March 2018 and publicly pressed for a sale of the company. D.E. Shaw joined the campaign later that year. In October 2018 the two settled with the board, adding three new independent directors including Greg Heckman, then a founding partner of Flatwater Partners and previously the CEO of Gavilon Group (sold to Marubeni for $3.6B in 2013). Longtime CEO Soren Schroder stepped down in January 2019; Heckman was named interim CEO immediately and made permanent in April 2019. His mandate — cut cost, exit sub-scale businesses (Brazilian margarine, an Iowa ethanol JV, various small elevators), run the company for cash — is the discipline that produced 2022’s crush-margin windfall (FY2022 revenue of $67.2B and near-record EPS) and set up the Viterra deal that closed six years after his appointment. Kathleen Hyle, a former SVP at Constellation Energy Group, chairs the board post-activist reset.

How it works

Physically, Bunge is a network business. It buys grain and oilseeds from farmers at a country elevator or a port silo, aggregates it into vessel- or unit-train-sized cargoes, moves it via barge (US inland waterways), rail, or truck to processing plants or export terminals, and either sells it as commodity grain to end buyers (feed compounders, flour millers, food manufacturers) or runs it through a crusher.

At a crush facility, an oilseed — typically soybean, but also canola, sunflower or rapeseed — is cracked, dehulled, flaked and either solvent-extracted or mechanically pressed to yield two products: crude vegetable oil (~18-20% of soybean mass) and protein meal (~78-80%), sold separately. The margin between the cost of the input soybean and the combined revenue from oil plus meal — the “crush spread” — is the single most important number Bunge trades. Refined oils go on for further processing (RBD — refined, bleached, deodorized — plus fractionation for specific fat profiles) and are sold to food-manufacturer, foodservice and, increasingly, renewable-diesel customers. Meal goes to animal-feed compounders.

Viterra brings a step earlier in the same chain: a much larger network of country elevators and export terminals in Canada, Australia and Argentina, along with a very large wheat and canola business Bunge historically underweighted. The strategic logic of the merger is that at each stage of the chain — origination, logistics, processing, marketing — scale drops unit cost slightly and takes another few basis points of margin off the trader’s opex line, and the combined footprint means fewer volumes are ever brokered through a third party.

Product and business overview

Bunge historically reports four operating segments and, post-Viterra, is realigning around a somewhat expanded structure.

• Agribusiness. The core origination-and-crushing business — buying grain and oilseeds, moving them, and crushing oilseeds into oil and meal. This is the largest segment by revenue and the most exposed to the crush spread cycle. Viterra’s assets fold primarily into this segment.
• Refined and Specialty Oils. Higher-margin, B2B-branded edible and industrial oils sold to food manufacturers (Bunge’s oils are behind a large share of packaged food fats sold in the Americas), foodservice and, increasingly, renewable-diesel producers. The most technology-forward segment.
• Milling. Wheat and corn milling, primarily in the Americas — a stable, modest-margin business.
• Sugar and Bioenergy. Brazilian sugar-cane-based ethanol, sugar and cogeneration, run since 2019 through BP-Bunge Bioenergia, a 50/50 joint venture with BP plc that consolidated Bunge’s prior standalone sugar business into the JV.

Business model and pricing

Revenue is booked as commodity is sold. There is no subscription tier, no take rate, no MSRP; the price of a bushel of soybeans or a tonne of soybean oil is set by continuous global markets (CBOT, ICE, Dalian) with Bunge earning a spread — some combination of basis differential, timing arbitrage, crush margin, refining premium and logistics fee — between what it pays the farmer and what the end buyer pays for a delivered cargo of oil, meal or grain.

This is what makes ABCD earnings hard to predict. Reported margins are thin (typically low single digits at the gross level) and volatile with the crush spread and the basis between local and international prices. When those spreads widen — as they did through 2021-2022 on the back of drought in South America, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and biofuel demand growth — Bunge earns outsized profit. When they normalize, Bunge earns much less. Adjusted EPS trajectory tells the story: Bunge printed roughly $14.87 in FY2022 during the peak crush window, then fell to the $8.65 range in FY2023-2024 as spreads normalized. That single-line swing — from ~$15 to ~$9 in two years, without Bunge doing anything wrong operationally — is why the equity trades at 0.2-0.3x sales, and why the Viterra deal was structured as scale insurance rather than a growth story.

Traction over time

Sources: Bunge 10-K filings (FY2019-FY2024); Bunge Q2 2026 earnings release (29 July 2026); Bunge press releases on Viterra close (2 July 2025). Employee count for 2025-2026 reflects the pro-forma combined workforce after the addition of Viterra’s ~17,000 employees.

The revenue table also shows the shape of the underlying commodity cycle: FY2019-2020 pre-COVID normalcy, the 2021-2022 spike as post-pandemic demand met Russia/Ukraine supply disruption and Brazilian drought, then the 2023-2024 normalization as new soybean crops and easing biofuel policy compressed spreads. The Q2 2026 print of $24.0B (+88% Y/Y) is entirely the Viterra scale effect — Q2 2025 was the last pre-close reference period, so year-over-year comps flatter reality until Q3 2026’s clean overlap.

Market analysis

Global grain and oilseed trade is a mature, cycle-heavy market: roughly 500 million tonnes of grain crossed borders in 2024, plus about 200 million tonnes of soybeans and 90 million tonnes of vegetable oil, on estimates from the USDA Foreign Agricultural Service. Dollar TAM depends heavily on price — nominal traded value across grain, oilseed and vegetable oil roughly doubled between 2020 and 2022 before pulling back — but a reasonable central estimate for the physical trader-served portion is $600-800B annual gross traded volume, of which the ABCD group historically captures 60-70% of internationally traded grain and oilseed flows.

Three structural forces matter for Bunge’s next decade. First, biofuel demand growth, particularly US renewable diesel and sustainable aviation fuel, is dragging incremental soybean and canola oil into fuel use, pushing crush volumes up but also inserting an oil-price floor tied to LCFS credit values that adds a new source of volatility. Second, China’s soybean import demand — the single largest destination for globally traded soy — has been softening from prior growth rates, driven by pork sector overcapacity, feed reformulation, and geopolitical hedging (COFCO’s expansion, alternative supplier diversification). Third, environmental compliance and traceability requirements — most immediately the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR), which entered force in 2025 with a phased compliance timeline — are converting reputational deforestation exposure (Cerrado, Amazon) into a hard-currency compliance cost for anyone shipping soy or beef into the EU. Bunge and Cargill together account for roughly 95% of soy exports from western Bahia to the EU, per an Earthsight investigation cited in Mongabay’s October 2025 reporting; that concentration means Bunge is disproportionately exposed to EUDR enforcement.

Competitive intel

Archer-Daniels-Midland is the closest listed peer and the read-through most damaging to Bunge’s multiple. In January 2024 ADM disclosed an SEC investigation into inter-segment transfer pricing at its Nutrition unit, placed CFO Vikram Luthar on administrative leave (he later resigned), and lost 24% of its market cap in a single trading session — its worst one-day drop since the Great Depression. Subsequent disclosures identified additional accounting errors and drew scrutiny to ADM’s executive compensation plan, which had tied more than $70M of stock awards to Nutrition-unit profitability growth. Bunge itself has not faced any equivalent restatement, but investors compressed the entire ABCD peer group’s forward multiple after the ADM disclosures on the reasonable inference that opaque segment accounting is a structural feature of the industry, not an ADM-specific failure.

Cargill, private and roughly 3-4x Bunge’s revenue at ~$160-178B trailing, out-invests Bunge in long-cycle assets and reportedly cut ~8,000 jobs (~5% of workforce) in 2024 as trader margins normalized — direct confirmation that Bunge’s earnings compression through 2023-2024 was industry-wide, not company-specific. Louis Dreyfus, roughly $50B in revenue and controlled by the Louis-Dreyfus family, sold a minority stake to Abu Dhabi’s ADQ (announced 2020, closed 2023), a signal that even the privately held incumbents are increasingly reaching for sovereign capital. COFCO International is the state-owned Chinese trader that sits between Bunge and its single largest customer country; China’s SAMR held approval of the Viterra deal until June 2025, seven months after every other jurisdiction cleared it, and the price of Chinese clearance included behavioral remedies that will shape competitive dynamics for years. Wilmar International dominates Southeast Asian palm and Chinese soybean crushing, with ADM as a large minority shareholder — a structural reminder that the ABCD group is not fully separable from the Asian tier.

Then there is the attacker cohort. Indigo Ag raised roughly $2B across ten rounds per PitchBook/Tracxn tracking, saw its valuation collapse from a $2.25B 2020 pre-money to a reported ~$200M in an August 2023 down round, but reported revenue growth from $163M in 2020 to about $1B in 2022. Its Market+ platform (rebranded 2024 from Indigo Grain Marketplace, launched September 2018) is an explicit attempt to disintermediate ABCD origination. Farmers Business Network raised >$900M with a peak valuation around $4B before the 2022-2024 ag-tech reset, offering direct inputs, financing and grain marketing services to farmer-owners. Bushel, with roughly $50M raised, sells the digital operating system to independent grain elevators — a pick-and-shovel play that arms Bunge’s would-be regional competitors with the software they need to run a modern elevator business. The three together have raised close to $2B; whether that adds up to a real disintermediation threat or a graveyard of down-rounds is the open ag-tech question.

History and evolution

• 1818 — Bunge founded in Amsterdam by Johann Peter Gottlieb Bunge.
• 1859 — Move to Antwerp; expansion into European grain trade.
• 1884 — Bunge y Born founded in Buenos Aires, Argentina.
• 1905 — First Brazilian subsidiary; South American origination footprint anchored.
• 1918 — Early 20th-century expansion into the United States begins.
• 2001 — Bunge Limited IPOs on the NYSE (ticker BG); incorporated in Bermuda for tax efficiency.
• 2018-03 — Continental Grain Company discloses ~1% stake in Bunge, publicly presses for sale.
• 2018-10 — Continental Grain and D.E. Shaw settle with the board: three new independent directors added, including Greg Heckman.
• 2019-01 — Soren Schroder steps down as CEO; Greg Heckman named interim CEO.
• 2019-04 — Heckman made permanent CEO.
• 2019 — Bunge and BP form 50/50 sugar-and-ethanol JV (BP-Bunge Bioenergia) in Brazil, folding Bunge’s standalone sugar business into the JV.
• 2022 — Crush-margin peak: FY revenue $67.2B, adjusted EPS ~$14.87.
• 2023-06-13 — $34B acquisition of Viterra announced (from Glencore, CPP Investments, BCI).
• 2023-11 — Bunge redomiciles from Bermuda to Switzerland; renamed Bunge Global SA.
• 2024-01 — Peer ADM discloses SEC accounting investigation; shares -24% in a day; drags ABCD multiples down.
• 2024 — Multiple regulators clear the Viterra deal; European Commission requires divestitures of Viterra’s Hungary business and Bodaczow (Poland) processing facility.
• 2025-06 — China’s State Administration for Market Regulation clears the deal — the last major regulatory holdout.
• 2025-07-02 — Viterra merger closes: ~65.6M Bunge shares plus ~$2.0B cash issued to Viterra shareholders (Glencore, CPP Investments, BCI); combined-company pro-forma revenue in the $60-67B range.
• 2025-10 — Mongabay/Earthsight investigation renews focus on Bunge and Cargill’s dominant share of western Bahia soy exports to the EU under the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR).
• 2026-07-29 — Q2 2026 results: net sales $24.0B (+88% Y/Y first full post-close quarter), adjusted EPS $2.00 vs. $1.31 Y/Y; FY2026 adjusted EPS guidance raised to $9.25-9.75.

What people say

The case for. Sell-side analysts covering Bunge post-Viterra frame the deal as a defensive-scale acquisition that resets Bunge’s origination footprint to match or exceed Cargill’s in the geographies (Canada, Australia, Argentina, wheat and canola) where standalone Bunge was subscale. Q2 2026’s raised full-year adjusted EPS guidance ($9.25-9.75) implies management is running ahead of its own synergy timetable. On employee sentiment, Glassdoor coverage of Bunge (multiple thousands of reviews across the pre- and post-Viterra footprint) shows a rating in the 3.5-3.9 range and consistent themes around competitive compensation, international mobility (a genuine differentiator for a global commodities employer), and — pointedly — a management style that reviewers describe as more disciplined and cost-conscious under Heckman than the pre-2019 Schroder era. Continental Grain and D.E. Shaw’s 2018-2019 activist campaign is frequently cited by long-only shareholders as evidence the current governance structure is more shareholder-aligned than it has ever been.

The complaints. Three specific themes recur. First, ADM read-through: the January 2024 ADM accounting scandal (SEC probe, CFO Vikram Luthar’s resignation, 24% one-day share drop) compressed the entire ABCD peer multiple and has not fully re-rated back even for peers, like Bunge, with clean audit histories. Investors have effectively priced in the assumption that segment transfer-pricing opacity is a systemic ABCD risk. Second, Cerrado and deforestation exposure: Mongabay’s October 2025 reporting on Earthsight’s investigation found that Bunge and Cargill together account for roughly 95% of soy exports from Brazil’s western Bahia to the EU, and specifically documented Bunge suppliers (Mizote Group, Franciosi Agro, the Comparin farm) associated with tens of thousands of hectares of Cerrado clearance in the 2021-2024 window — sixty percent of which reportedly had no identified deforestation permit. Bunge has publicly committed to a deforestation-free supply chain by 2025, but its own traceability disclosures (roughly 80% of soy in the region traced) are exactly the gap the EU Deforestation Regulation is now hard-coding into compliance requirements. Third, activist history and governance memory: the 2018-2019 Continental Grain/D.E. Shaw campaign that unseated Soren Schroder is a permanent feature of the shareholder register — Continental Grain retained a stake — and creates ongoing pressure on capital allocation, buyback pacing, and any signal that Viterra integration is slipping. The Glassdoor negative themes are the standard commodities-trader complaints (long hours, siloed regional politics, slow career mobility outside a handful of trading hubs) but include specific post-2019 mentions of a cost-cutting culture that some employees describe as demoralizing.

Outlook: well positioned or at risk?

At-risk. The Viterra scale bet is real and, at Q2 2026’s guidance raise, tracking. But the three structural pressures that made Bunge a mid-teens P/E stock trading at 0.2-0.3x sales in 2026 are still intact. First, crush-margin normalization: adjusted EPS fell from ~$14.87 in FY2022 to ~$8.65 in FY2023-2024, and the drop was industry-wide (Cargill’s 2024 headcount cut of ~8,000 confirmed as much). The 2022 windfall was a cyclical peak driven by Ukraine/Russia and South American drought; there is no reason to model it as a new normal. Second, peer-scandal multiple compression: the ADM January 2024 accounting revelations dragged the ABCD group multiple down not because Bunge did anything wrong but because investors reasonably updated their prior on how much segment-transfer opacity to trust across the industry. That re-rating has not reversed. Third, attacker-cohort disintermediation of origination: Indigo Ag’s Market+, Farmers Business Network, and Bushel together have raised roughly $2B specifically to bypass the ABCD origination layer — the exact layer Bunge just doubled down on with $34B of Viterra scale. Even if the current cohort down-rounds through, the technology thesis — that a farmer with a smartphone and a basis-hedging tool no longer needs a country elevator — is not going away.

Two Viterra-specific risks compound the base case. The 25+ jurisdictional regulatory reviews the deal required (concluding with the June 2025 Chinese SAMR clearance and the European Commission’s Hungary/Poland divestiture remedies) have left behavioral obligations across multiple markets that constrain how Bunge can compete for the next several years. Integration risk on a ~$34B deal touching every meaningful grain-producing region is the standard “combined company underperforms sum of parts” concern that has repeatedly caught even well-managed commodity mergers. Cerrado/EUDR exposure — Bunge and Cargill sharing ~95% of western Bahia’s EU-bound soy per Earthsight/Mongabay — converts a former CSR narrative into a hard compliance and offtake risk in the exact geography Bunge is most dominant.

The scenario that flips this call: crush spreads re-widen to 2021-2022 levels for a structural reason (US renewable-diesel policy expansion beyond current LCFS trajectories, sustained supply shock), Viterra integration lands 100 bps of margin above deal-model synergies, and the EU somehow relaxes EUDR enforcement — some combination of which is possible, none of which is base-case. The base case is normal-cycle earnings against a compressed multiple and a slowly rising attacker share of the origination base.

How to attack it

Do not attack Bunge’s crush plants or export terminals head-on — the physical asset base is capital-intensive, permitted decades ago, and now larger post-Viterra. Attack the origination layer at the front, and the marketing/hedging layer above it, using software plus balance-sheet primitives Bunge cannot easily replicate.

Wedge 1: A digital elevator co-op plus basis-hedging-as-a-service. The single most disintermediable relationship in the ABCD stack is the country elevator — a physical grain storage facility that today either belongs to an ABCD player, a legacy farmer-owned co-op, or an independent operator running on Bushel’s software. A new entrant could roll up independent elevators or arm existing ones with (a) real-time basis pricing that beats ABCD’s opaque bids, (b) direct-to-end-buyer contract routing (Indigo’s Market+ thesis, cleaner), and (c) programmatic basis and futures hedging as a service — the piece Indigo has under-built. The farmer sees a better price and a hedged forward contract; the end buyer (a feed compounder, a biodiesel producer, an EU food manufacturer needing EUDR-clean supply) sees a traceable origination story. Bunge’s answer would require rewiring incentives across a 40,000-person organization built to keep origination margin in-house.

Wedge 2: Vertical AI ag-intel for oilseed crushers and refined-oil buyers. Bunge sells refined and specialty oils to food manufacturers on a relationship-and-quality basis. A vertical AI platform that ingests satellite crop data (planet-scale imagery is now $1-cent-per-acre economics), USDA and CONAB reports, weather, freight rate curves, and CBOT/ICE order flow to predict local basis and crush spreads at 4-6 week horizons would arm mid-market food and biofuel buyers with pricing intelligence that today only ABCD marketing desks have. This is the CommerceIQ-for-crush-buyers play, and it does not require any physical asset; it just requires selling to the 500-2,000 industrial buyers who currently pay Bunge a margin because they cannot see the market as well as Bunge can.

Enumerated Bunge weaknesses. (i) Post-Viterra integration risk across ~40,000 employees, 25+ regulatory jurisdictions and remedy commitments — a natural distraction window. (ii) Cerrado/EUDR exposure documented by Earthsight and Mongabay in 2024-2025 that a clean-sourcing attacker could turn into a positive selling point with EU food buyers. (iii) ADM-scandal-driven multiple compression that raises Bunge’s cost of equity relative to any pure-software attacker not saddled with ABCD’s association. (iv) Talent risk: Glassdoor complaints of cost-cutting-culture demoralization from the Heckman era give ag-tech recruiters an opening to hire mid-level Bunge trading and origination talent for a fraction of the ABCD in-place cost. (v) The Continental Grain / D.E. Shaw activist history means capital allocation is constantly being second-guessed — a governance environment less conducive to aggressive counter-attack than a private competitor’s. (vi) Basis and crush-spread transparency is Bunge’s revealed edge; a well-priced data product erodes it.

Adjacent-segment play

The most direct adjacent play is Bunge’s crush and logistics data as commodity intelligence SaaS. Bunge internally sees more real-time origination, crush-spread and vessel-loading data than most participants in the market; that dataset packaged into a subscription analytics product for the mid-market buyer, biofuels producer or grower-facing lender is a business Bunge is culturally poorly-suited to build (it would rather monetize the information asymmetry directly in trading), and a specific SaaS attacker (Gro Intelligence-alike, but focused on oilseed-and-grain crush economics rather than macro ag intel) could build. Gro Intelligence itself flamed out in 2024, but the demand it validated — buyers wanting neutral, real-time ag data — did not disappear.

A second adjacent-segment play is specialty B2C refined oils built on Bunge-adjacent supply chains. Bunge’s Refined and Specialty Oils segment sells fats and oils in bulk to food manufacturers, not to consumers. A brand-owned, farm-to-bottle specialty-oil business (avocado, olive, high-oleic sunflower, algal DHA) using Bunge-style processing know-how but consumer distribution can build a margin structure that is 3-5x the underlying commodity spread. Chosen Foods and Primal Kitchen already occupy pieces of this at the premium end; the wedge for a new entrant is regenerative-farming certification plus EUDR-clean sourcing as the brand story.

A third, weaker adjacent is carbon-and-sustainability programmatic origination: paying farmers a premium for verified low-carbon or deforestation-free grain and selling the resulting “clean” commodity into buyers with EUDR, SBTi Scope 3 or LCFS-linked willingness-to-pay. This wedge is real but crowded — Bunge itself, ADM, Cargill and Louis Dreyfus all have programs, and Indigo’s original carbon business validated it — so a new entrant would need a differentiated origination network to compete. The commodity intelligence SaaS play and the specialty B2C oils play both generalize on capabilities Bunge revealed (data, refining) but did not commercialize as an end product; the carbon origination play is closer to a feature Bunge is already competing on.

Sources and further reading

• Bunge Reports Second Quarter 2026 Results — Bunge investor relations, 29 July 2026.
• Bunge Reports Fourth Quarter and Full-Year 2025 Results — Bunge investor relations, 4 February 2026.
• Bunge, Viterra Merger Clears Chinese Regulatory Hurdle to Close — DTN/Progressive Farmer, 13 June 2025.
• Bunge closes $34 billion global acquisition of Viterra — Compass Lexecon, July 2025.
• How a 205-year-old grain dynasty won an activist victory over Bunge — Farm Progress, 2018.
• Bunge Appoints Gregory A. Heckman as CEO — Bunge press release, April 2019.
• ADM identifies additional accounting errors — Farm Progress, 2024.
• ADM reports more accounting errors, cancels earnings call — Agriculture Dive, 2024.
• ADM accounting scandal, nutrition unit, $70 million stock awards and bonuses — Fortune, 24 January 2024.
• Deforestation for soy continues in Brazilian Cerrado despite EUDR looming — Mongabay, October 2025.
• Brazil: Bunge soybeans supplier who received loans from John Deere and BNDES is fined for connections to illegal deforestation — Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, 2023-2024.
• Indigo Ag valuation down 94% to $200 million in latest funding round — Calcalist, 29 August 2023.
• Indigo Agriculture Raises $250M and Launches Digital Grain Marketplace — Indigo Ag, September 2018.
• Bunge Global SA — Form 8-K on Viterra merger close — SEC EDGAR, July 2025.