Teardown

Retail · Deep dive

Best Buy

The last big-box electronics chain standing — $41.7B of revenue that has gone sideways for three straight years while Amazon took the category crown, now betting a relaunched third-party marketplace, a retail-media network, and an AI-PC upgrade cycle can outrun tariffs, a $475M health-care write-off, and its fourth CEO handoff.

at risk

Best Buy sells commodity hardware that Amazon undercuts, Walmart cross-subsidizes, and Costco bundles, and after three years of flat ~$41.5B revenue, an electronics-share crown ceded to Amazon, a $475M health write-off, and growth bets (marketplace, retail media) that copy its rivals a decade late, the franchise is managing decline profitably rather than compounding.

My take

HQ
Richfield, Minnesota
Founded
1966 (as Sound of Music, St. Paul, Minnesota; renamed Best Buy 1983)
Ownership
Public (NYSE: BBY); institution-dominated float; founder Richard Schulze remains chairman emeritus and a major individual holder
Funding
Sound of Music went public in 1969; NYSE-listed as Best Buy since 1987; self-funded since, with dividends and buybacks ($1.07B returned to shareholders in fiscal 2026)
Valuation
Market capitalization approximately $18.3B as of July 22, 2026 (MacroTrends/companiesmarketcap), on fiscal 2026 revenue of $41.7B; consensus analyst price target near $86 (Benzinga, July 2026)
Revenue
$41.69B enterprise revenue in fiscal 2026 (ended January 31, 2026), up 0.4% with comparable sales +0.5%; Q1 fiscal 2027 (reported May 28, 2026) revenue $8.94B with comps +2.0%; FY2027 guidance $41.2-42.1B revenue and $6.30-6.60 adjusted EPS (company releases, March and May 2026)
Headcount
Roughly 85,000 as of early 2026, down from about 125,000 in early 2020 — more than 30,000 jobs cut during Corie Barry's tenure (Fortune, April 2026; company filings)
Screen
Public incumbent — $41.7B fiscal 2026 revenue and an enterprise value comfortably above $10B including debt and a large lease book (company filings, 2026)
Published
2026-07-24
Web
www.bestbuy.com
Elsewhere
LinkedIn · Crunchbase

Founders and leadership

  • Richard Schulze Founder; Chairman Emeritus

    An Air National Guardsman and consumer-electronics rep's son who skipped college, Schulze opened the Sound of Music hi-fi store in St. Paul, Minnesota on August 22, 1966 with roughly $10,500 (initially alongside partner James Wheeler, whom he soon bought out). When a 1981 tornado tore the roof off his best store, he ran a parking-lot 'Tornado Sale' promising 'best buys' — the crowds convinced him that low prices and big selection beat high-margin audiophile service, and in 1983 he renamed the company Best Buy and went superstore. He built it to the national No. 1, stepped back as CEO in 2002, and resigned as chairman in 2012 after failing to tell the board about CEO Brian Dunn's relationship with an employee; his ~$8.8B take-private bid that year went nowhere, and he settled into a chairman-emeritus role he still holds.

  • Corie Barry Chief Executive Officer (June 2019 - October 2026)

    A 27-year Best Buy lifer — analyst, field roles, CFO, then chief strategic transformation officer under Hubert Joly, where she helped architect the Building the New Blue growth plan. As CEO she steered the company through the pandemic demand spike and its long hangover, cutting more than 30,000 jobs, shrinking the store base, exiting most of Best Buy Health, and launching the marketplace and ads businesses. Praised for protecting margins, criticized for never restarting growth: revenue in her final full year ($41.7B, fiscal 2026) was below her first. Best Buy announced her exit on April 22, 2026; she stays a strategic adviser for six months.

  • Jason Bonfig Incoming Chief Executive Officer (effective October 31, 2026)

    Joined Best Buy in 1999 as an inventory analyst and rose almost entirely through merchandising, becoming chief merchandising officer and then, from 2023, chief customer, product and fulfillment officer — a portfolio spanning merchandising, e-commerce, marketing, supply chain, Best Buy Canada, and Best Buy Ads. He personally led the creation of the US marketplace and the scaling of the ads business, the two initiatives the growth case rests on. The sixth CEO in company history, and the third consecutive insider.

Snapshot

Best Buy is the last national big-box consumer-electronics chain in America — roughly 1,083 stores worldwide as of November 1, 2025, and $41.7B of fiscal 2026 revenue (year ended January 31, 2026) — and the purest public-market bet on whether physical electronics retail still deserves to exist. Its 1990s rivals (Circuit City, CompUSA, RadioShack) are dead; its rivals today (Amazon, Walmart, Costco) sell the same boxes as a sideline. It matters now for three reasons: it just ceded US electronics-share leadership to Amazon; it is mid-pivot toward asset-light revenue — a marketplace relaunched in August 2025 and a fast-growing retail-media arm — while absorbing tariffs on a supply chain that was 55% Chinese-sourced as recently as March 2025; and on October 31, 2026 it hands Corie Barry’s seven-year cost-cutting regime to merchandising veteran Jason Bonfig.

Founding story

Richard Schulze, a St. Paul consumer-electronics rep’s son who never attended college, opened the Sound of Music hi-fi store on August 22, 1966 with about $10,500, initially alongside partner James Wheeler, whom he soon bought out. The company went public in 1969 as a modest Twin Cities audio chain. The pivot came from weather: in June 1981 a tornado tore the roof off his highest-volume Roseville store, and Schulze threw a parking-lot “Tornado Sale” advertising “best buys” on damaged and excess stock — drawing bigger crowds than the store had ever seen. The lesson stuck: volume, price, and selection beat commissioned audiophile salesmanship. In 1983 he renamed the company Best Buy and went superstore; in 1989 the “Concept II” format removed commissioned salespeople entirely, a heresy vendors first boycotted and then copied. Schulze handed off the CEO role in 2002 and left the chairmanship in 2012 after failing to tell the board about CEO Brian Dunn’s relationship with a subordinate; his ~$8.8B take-private attempt collapsed, and the board instead hired Hubert Joly, whose Renew Blue plan — Amazon price-matching to kill showrooming, $1B+ of cost cuts, vendor-funded store-in-stores — became one of modern retail’s canonical turnarounds. Barry, Joly’s transformation chief, inherited the company in June 2019.

How it works

Mechanically, Best Buy is a showroom that vendors pay to occupy. The floor of a typical big-box is carved into branded shops — Apple, Samsung, Microsoft, Sony, LG, at points Tesla and Amazon — where the manufacturer funds fixtures, displays, and in some cases dedicated labor; supply-chain reporting in 2022 noted roughly $20M of vendor funding offsetting SG&A in a single quarter, and the experiential-remodel program (about 300 locations targeted through 2025) deepens the model. It is Joly’s structural answer to showrooming: if customers treat the store as a demo room, charge the brands for the demo room.

Around the showroom wraps a fulfillment and services layer: stores double as forward warehouses for online orders — Best Buy’s genuine speed edge over Amazon in big-ticket categories — and Geek Squad (founded 1994, acquired 2002) handles delivery, installation, repair, and support, the labor moat Amazon has never replicated, though Best Buy keeps thinning it in layoffs. Since August 19, 2025, a Mirakl-powered third-party marketplace rides on top of bestbuy.com: hand-vetted sellers (about 500 at launch, 1,100+ by January 31, 2026) list adjacent assortment, Best Buy takes a category-based commission it has not publicly rate-carded, and Best Buy Ads sells the resulting traffic back to brands. The company is the importer of record for only 2-3% of sales (management, May 2026) — vendors carry most direct tariff exposure — though tariff costs flow through wholesale prices regardless.

Product and business overview

The business has five named components. Retail — about 1,083 stores including Canada as of November 1, 2025 — sells computing, TVs, appliances, mobile, and gaming; computing, gaming, mobile, and services led fiscal 2026 comparable-sales growth. Geek Squad and services monetize installation, repair, and support, increasingly bundled into memberships. Best Buy Marketplace is the August 2025 relaunch of an idea tried and shut down in 2016; it generated roughly $300M of gross merchandise value in fiscal Q4 2026 alone (Digital Commerce 360, March 2026). Best Buy Ads, the retail-media network, nearly doubled its advertiser count in fiscal 2026. Best Buy Health is the component in retreat: after buying GreatCall ($800M, 2018), Critical Signal Technologies (2019), and Current Health ($400M, 2021), the company took a $475M goodwill impairment in fiscal 2025, booked $109M of restructuring in Q1 fiscal 2026, sold Current Health back to founder Christopher McGhee in June 2025, and laid off 161 health employees effective September 2025.

Business model and pricing

Revenue is overwhelmingly first-party retail sell-through — hardware bought wholesale and resold at thin margins (fiscal 2026 operating income ran near a 4% enterprise rate). The margin kicker is attach: services, warranties, memberships, financing, and now commissions and ads. The membership ladder, rebuilt in June 2023 from the failed $199.99 Totaltech program, has three rungs: My Best Buy (free; free standard shipping), My Best Buy Plus ($49.99/year; exclusive prices, 60-day returns, free 2-day shipping — with an annual-plan price cut announced May 2026), and My Best Buy Total ($179.99/year; everything in Plus, 24/7 Geek Squad support, protection plans including AppleCare+ on most purchases, 20% off repairs). Marketplace commissions vary by category and are undisclosed; the strategic point, per management in March 2026, is that fiscal 2027 is the last heavy investment year, with material operating-income contribution from marketplace and ads expected in fiscal 2028-2029. Tariff mitigation follows the standard stack — vendor negotiation, re-sourcing (China fell from ~55% of product sourcing in March 2025 to 30-35% by late May 2025, with Vietnam, India, South Korea and Taiwan absorbing volume), pull-forward inventory buys, and, last, price increases, hitting shelves by mid-May 2025 after Barry called them “highly likely.”

Traction over time

Fiscal year (ends late Jan/early Feb)Enterprise revenueComparable salesNotes
FY2021$47.3B+9.7%Pandemic demand surge
FY2022$51.8B+10.4%All-time peak
FY2023$46.3B-10.3%The hangover begins
FY2024$43.5B-6.8%Second straight decline
FY2025$41.5B~-2%$475M Best Buy Health impairment
FY2026$41.7B+0.5%First positive comp in four years; Q4 comps -0.8%
Q1 FY2027$8.9B+2.0%May 2026 month-to-date comps up high single digits

Sources: company earnings releases and MacroTrends, 2021-2026. The shape is unmistakable: a $10B pandemic windfall fully surrendered, then three years pinned at ~$41.5B. Fiscal 2026’s +0.5% comp — the first annual gain since fiscal 2022 — leaned on gaming, computing, and mobile, and Q4 holiday comps still fell 0.8% (reported March 3, 2026). Profitability tells a better story: Q4 operating margin recovered to 5.2% from 1.6% a year earlier (which absorbed the health impairment), and FY2027 guidance of $41.2-42.1B revenue with $6.30-6.60 adjusted EPS was reiterated in May 2026. Headcount, ~125,000 in early 2020, is roughly 85,000 now; the ~$18.3B market cap (July 22, 2026) sits far below the 2021 peak.

Market analysis

The US consumer-electronics market was worth roughly $250B in 2025 (Grand View Research), with forecasters projecting ~4.7-4.8% annual growth into the 2030s — growth that accrues to channels, not category specialists. Three structural forces define Best Buy’s decade. First, replacement-cycle dependence: the industry is betting the Windows 10 end-of-life (October 2025) plus Copilot+ AI PCs — forecast to scale from ~5.2M units in 2025 toward ~47.7M by 2028 — restarts the computing cycle; fiscal 2026’s computing-led comps suggest it has begun. Second, channel shift: Amazon’s ~30% share of tracked electronics spending now exceeds Best Buy’s ~28%, and every point that moves online erodes big-box fixed-cost leverage. Third, policy: 2025’s tariffs raised input costs across a category with near-total Asian manufacturing dependence, and DRAM inflation heading into late 2026 threatens the affordability of the very AI PCs the bull case needs.

Competitive intel

Amazon (~30% of tracked US electronics spend, 2024-2025) beat Best Buy on price and assortment and now beats it on share; Best Buy’s remaining edges are immediacy, Geek Squad installation, and vendor experiences Amazon cannot stage. Walmart ($713B revenue, fiscal 2026; ~12.8% electronics share) sells electronics as traffic bait atop a grocery machine and ran the marketplace-plus-retail-media playbook years earlier. Costco turns TVs and laptops into near-zero-margin membership perks with return policies that embarrass paid protection plans — it cherry-picks Best Buy’s best transactions. Target nibbles at accessories, gaming, and seasonal tech across 1,900+ stores. Micro Center (~28 stores, private) owns the enthusiast — components, DIY builds, expert staff — capturing the highest-spend computing customers exactly where the AI-PC cycle concentrates. And the vendors themselves — Apple, Samsung, Dell — sell direct around Best Buy even while renting its floors; it needs Apple far more than Apple needs it.

History and evolution

What people say

The case for. Bulls note the stock screens cheap — below peer earnings multiples in mid-2026 (Yahoo Finance analysis), consensus target near $86 against an ~$18.3B market cap — for a company that stayed profitable through a $10B revenue drawdown and returned $1.07B to shareholders in fiscal 2026. Sell-side coverage in March-May 2026 credited execution: Q2 FY2026’s +1.6% comp was the best in three years, fiscal 2026 comps turned positive, the marketplace onboarded sellers faster than planned, and Best Buy Ads nearly doubled its advertiser base. Geek Squad and vendor store-in-stores are things Amazon structurally cannot copy, and the AI-PC/Windows-10-sunset cycle plays to Best Buy’s premium-computing strength. Customer praise clusters on knowledgeable in-store help and fast pickup.

The complaints. The service moat is fraying in public. Geek Squad’s Trustpilot pages run heavily negative — recurring themes are unreachable live agents, outsourced phone support, no-show appointments (one reviewer describes a four-hour window nobody honored), unresolved repairs, and difficulty canceling recurring membership charges. Employees tell the same story from inside: Retail Dive reporting and Reddit threads document years of hours cuts (income reductions up to 40% at 150 restructured stores starting January 2021), 2024 Geek Squad layoffs, and thinner floor staffing that veterans say guts the expertise the model depends on — 30,000+ jobs cut under Barry, per Fortune (April 2026). The bear case ties it together: flat revenue since fiscal 2024, negative Q4 FY2026 holiday comps, category leadership lost to Amazon (CIRP data, 2025), tariffs taxing cost of goods while DRAM inflation threatens AI-PC affordability, and a health diversification that ended in a $475M write-off — evidence, Fortune argued in April 2026, that a well-managed comeback “fizzled” into stasis.

Outlook: well positioned or at risk?

At-risk. The uncomfortable core of Best Buy is that it is a superb operator of a structurally disadvantaged position. Everything it sells is a commodity someone else sells cheaper: Amazon with a lower cost structure and 30% of the category, Walmart with grocery-subsidized pricing, Costco treating TVs as membership loss leaders. Its differentiators — Geek Squad labor, vendor showrooms, immediacy — are real but eroding from both ends: the company keeps cutting the labor that constitutes the moat, and the Trustpilot record suggests customers have noticed. Three straight years at ~$41.5B of revenue is not a plateau; in a category growing ~4.7% a year, it is share loss with good expense control. The growth initiatives are rational but derivative — Walmart and Amazon ran the marketplace and retail-media playbooks roughly a decade earlier, and Best Buy’s own first marketplace died in 2016. The escape hatch, Best Buy Health, consumed ~$1.2B of acquisitions and ended in impairment, divestiture, and layoffs inside seven years.

The well-positioned case deserves its hearing. The balance sheet is clean, profitability held through the drawdown, fiscal 2026 comps inflected positive, Q1 FY2027 comps of +2.0% beat guidance with May running up high single digits, and the AI-PC replacement cycle is a genuine, dated tailwind (Windows 10 support ended October 2025) in Best Buy’s strongest category. If marketplace and ads deliver the promised operating-income contribution in fiscal 2028-2029, margins improve without an incremental store visit — and Bonfig, who built both businesses, is the right insider for the plan. But the plan’s ceiling is the problem: it monetizes existing traffic better; it does not create a reason for traffic to grow. Every prior cycle — flat panels, smartphones, the pandemic — lifted revenue and then receded to a lower structural share, as Amazon’s logistics and vendors’ direct channels took a bigger cut of each wave. An AI-PC bump in fiscal 2027-2028 is likely; a durable reversal of a fifteen-year share bleed is not. A company whose best case is harvesting a defensible niche more profitably while its largest competitor compounds share is at risk. The verdict is about trajectory, not solvency: Best Buy will be here in 2030; the question is how much smaller its claim on the category will be.

How a challenger would attack it

Rebuild the service moat Best Buy is dismantling, in small boxes. Best Buy’s only non-commodity assets are expert labor and physical immediacy — and it has cut 30,000+ jobs, slashed store hours up to 40% at restructured locations, and let Geek Squad’s Trustpilot record fill with no-show appointments and unreachable agents. Micro Center already proves the counter-model at ~28 stores: deep inventory in high-attachment computing, genuinely knowledgeable staff, cult loyalty among the highest-spend customers. A challenger scales that formula — 15,000-square-foot enthusiast-grade stores in the top 50 metros, staffed by the experienced techs Best Buy laid off, timed to the AI-PC/Windows-10 replacement cycle that concentrates spend in exactly the advice-heavy category where a hollowed-out floor loses. The second vector is services unbundled from retail: a standalone, tech-enabled install-and-repair network (transparent scheduling, live technician tracking, no $179.99 membership gate) attacks the Total membership’s weakest point — customers who report difficulty even canceling recurring charges. Third, exploit the vendor tension: Apple, Samsung and Dell rent Best Buy’s floors while selling around it; a challenger offering brands better-instrumented showroom economics — retail-media-grade attribution on physical demos — competes for the same vendor funding that offsets Best Buy’s SG&A, roughly $20M in a single quarter. Best Buy can’t respond by re-adding labor without breaking the margin story its ~$18.3B valuation rests on.

Same playbook, new buyer

Vendor-funded showrooms and attach economics work wherever hardware is confusing and installation is the product. The Joly model — charge brands for the demo floor, monetize the customer with services and memberships — transfers to home energy (heat pumps, EV chargers, solar-plus-battery: high-ticket, advice-dependent, installer-constrained, no national retail face), smart-home and security retrofits, and health/mobility tech for aging-in-place — the market Best Buy correctly identified with GreatCall and then abandoned after a $475M write-off, leaving validated demand with no scaled retail channel. Each buyer needs exactly what big-box electronics no longer does: see the product, trust the advice, book the install. A B2B shift is equally open: Geek Squad-style deployment and support for small businesses (POS, networking, fleets of laptops) sold as managed service, a segment Best Buy’s consumer-store cost structure and shrinking labor base can’t serve. Best Buy won’t follow into any of these — its next three years are contractually narrated to Wall Street as marketplace-and-ads margin harvest, its health retreat burned the board’s appetite for adjacency, and every incremental dollar of labor investment contradicts the cost-cut regime both the outgoing and incoming CEO built their careers on.

Sources and further reading

Capital history

DateRoundAmountValuationLead(s)
August 22, 1966 Founding — Sound of Music ~$10,500 initial investment Hi-fi audio store, St. Paul, Minnesota Richard Schulze (with James Wheeler, soon bought out)
1969 IPO (Sound of Music) Public listing Three-store Twin Cities audio retailer Public markets
1983 Rebrand and superstore pivot Post-tornado-sale reinvention First Best Buy superstore, Burnsville, Minnesota Richard Schulze
1987 NYSE listing (BBY) Moves to the Big Board National big-box rollout begins Public markets
August 2012 Failed founder buyout ~$8.8B ($24-26/share) proposal by Richard Schulze Rejected/lapsed; Hubert Joly hired instead; Schulze returns as chairman emeritus 2013 Richard Schulze with PE partners (never consummated)
2018-2021 Best Buy Health build-out ~$800M GreatCall (2018), Critical Signal Technologies (2019), ~$400M Current Health (2021) Health bet later impaired ($475M goodwill, fiscal 2025) and largely unwound Corporate M&A
April 22, 2026 CEO succession Jason Bonfig named CEO effective October 31, 2026 Corie Barry to strategic adviser for six months Board of Directors

Investors / owners: Institutional index and active managers (Vanguard, BlackRock, State Street and peers dominate the float), Richard Schulze, founder and chairman emeritus, historically among the largest individual holders, Dividend investors — Best Buy has paid and grown a dividend through the entire post-2013 turnaround era

Competitive set

  • Amazon — The company that took the crown: Amazon captured about 30% of tracked US consumer-electronics spending versus Best Buy's 28% in 2024-2025 data (Consumer Intelligence Research Partners coverage), formally ending Best Buy's category leadership. Amazon wins on price, endless assortment, and Prime logistics; Best Buy's counters — same-day store fulfillment, Geek Squad installation, the ability to see a TV before buying — matter most in big-ticket, high-touch categories.
  • Walmart (NYSE: WMT) — $713B revenue in fiscal 2026 and the ability to sell electronics at grocery-subsidized margins Best Buy cannot match. Walmart held roughly 12.8% of US electronics spending (2024 tracking data) and relaunched its own marketplace years earlier — the playbook Best Buy is now copying.
  • Costco (Nasdaq: COST) — A single-digit share of US electronics spending but a lethal one: TVs and laptops sold near cost to a 79M-household membership base, with generous return policies and bundled warranties that undercut the case for Best Buy Total. Costco skims the highest-value transactions in Best Buy's most profitable categories.
  • Target (NYSE: TGT) — Single-digit electronics share, strongest in mobile accessories, gaming, and seasonal tech — a convenience-led nibble at Best Buy's traffic rather than a frontal assault, but one with 1,900+ stores of distribution.
  • Micro Center — Private, ~28 stores, and the enthusiast's revealed preference: deep component inventory (CPUs, GPUs, DIY builds) and knowledgeable staff give it a cult following in the exact high-attachment-rate computing categories Best Buy needs for the AI-PC cycle. Small footprint, but expanding — and it wins the customers who spend the most per basket.
  • Apple (direct) and brand DTC — Apple's own stores and site, Samsung.com, Dell and HP direct: every major vendor now sells around its retailers. Best Buy's store-in-store partnerships monetize this tension — vendors fund shops inside Best Buy — but each DTC upgrade cycle sold directly is margin Best Buy never sees.